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Meredith M. Render'
ABSTRACT: Sex stereotypes are of perennial concern within
antidiscrimination law and theory, yet there is widespread disagreement about
what constitutes a "sex stereotype." This Article enters the debate surrounding
the correct understanding of "stereotype" and posits that the concept is too thin
to serve as a criterion for distinguishing "discriminatory" gender
generalizations from non-discriminatory, probabilistic descriptions of behavior.
Instead, "stereotype" is a heuristic that has been used by courts and
commentators to crudely capture judgments about the justness of applying sex-
respecting rules. In this light, the Article argues that the stereotype heuristic
should be abandoned in favor of a rule-centered analysis of sex-respecting
generalizations. Arguing that courts and commentators have not objected to
gender generalizations because they are descriptively inaccurate (as the
stereotype heuristic suggests) but because they also exert unique prescriptive
force, the Article provides a new understanding of the theoretical basis for
subjecting gender generalizations to antidiscrimination scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
Men, as a rule, do not wear dresses. Whether this should be so lies outside
the scope of this piece, but that this is so is a kind of phenomenon: it is a
widespread convergence of behavior that is predicated on a broadly observed
social rule.2 An authoritative formulation of this rule is difficult to articulate,
1 This statement should be qualified: in dominant American culture men do not wear dresses publicly
outside of performance contexts. Also, even within the preceding qualification, some American men do
wear dresses in mainstream and non-performance contexts-hence, although the rule applies
prescriptive force to the behavior of most men, it is not universally observed. However, the lack of
universal observation does not undermine its status as a rule. No prescriptive rule is universally
observed. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 1-3 (1991) [hereinafter RULES].
2 This kind of social rule is described by Hart as a "conventional social rule" in which the rule (i.e., men
do not wear dresses) applies normative force by virtue of its acceptance, which provides an independent
reason (or at least part of the reason) that members of the regulated community act in conformity with
the practice the rule prescribes (i.e., men not wearing dresses). H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-
57, 256-57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1961). It is important to distinguish at the outset the kinds of
"gender rules" at issue here from what Hart identified as "social habits," which he describes as "mere
convergences in behavior between members of a social group" that do not create pressure to act in
accordance with the convergence. Id.
Moreover, to be clear, the proposition "men do not wear dresses" might be understood to be purely
descriptive-or, at most, what Frederick Schauer has described as a "descriptive rule." SCHAUER,
RULES, supra note 1, at 1-2. In other words, we might mean simply to communicate an observed
regularity that lacks normative force. Schauer distinguishes "descriptive rules," which he understands to
merely describe regularities (e.g., "it rains more in Mobile than in Birmingham"), from what he terms
"mandatory rules," which he describes as rule that "when accepted, furnish reasons for action simply by
virtue of their existence qua rules, and thus generate normative pressure even in those cases in which the
justifications (rationales) underlying the rules indicate a contrary result." Id. at 5. The propositional
content of the "gender rules" primarily at issue in this piece are comprised of generalities that exert
normative force (i.e., apply pressure directly to behavior). The phrase "men do not wear dresses" is
distinguishable from a purely descriptive generalization. Insofar as the fact that men do not wear dresses
becomes a reason not to wear a dress and that reason replaces independent reasons one might have to
wear a dress (comfort, preference to exhibit femininity, and so forth), then "men do not wear dresses" is
a prescriptive rule. For a discussion of how rules provide a reason for action, see JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975); SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1,
at 5.
Finally, while the arguments presented here do not turn on this point and Hart's use of the term
"conventional" notwithstanding, I would be clear that I do not take the "gender rules" discussed here to
be a subset of a specific type of social rule known as a "convention." See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION:
A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969) (presenting the dominant account of conventional behavior); see also
ANDREI MARMOR, SOCIAL CONVENTIONS (2009) (challenging Lewis's account). However, an
explanation of how gender rules differ from both Lewis' and Marmor's accounts of conventional
2010] Gender Rules 135
and justifications for the rule are even more elusive. 3 But when men do wear
dresses, we understand this act to bear a significance that is distinct from the
significance attached to a woman wearing a dress, and we know this without
being explicitly instructed on the content of the rule, without knowing why the
rule exists, and without necessarily believing it to be justified. Instead, we
understand the rules of gender the way we understand the rules of English: we
are conversant in them. 4
Moreover, we rely on our mastery of gender rules in confronting all
manner of sex-respecting distinctions. Consider, for example, an employer's
rule that allows female but not male employees to wear dresses to work. The
employer rule draws a distinction between men and women. Is the distinction
behavior (and why these differences are significant) regrettably exceeds the scope of this project.
Instead, it is sufficient here to note that conventions arise in response to the need for uniformity in an
area of behavior, and part of the normative force that creates the regularity of a convention issues from
the benefit that is accrued by the fact of the regularity itself. The gender rules that I am describing share
neither of these features. For a survey of the literature concerning social conventions, see DAVID HUME,
A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (1740); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960);
Hilary Putnam, Convention: A Theme in Philosophy, 13 NEW LITERARY HIST. 1 (1981); Elizabeth
Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL &
PUBL. AFF. 170 (2000).
The gender rules discussed here are principally unformulated rules: there are no authoritative sources
(e.g., statutes, signposts, or scripture) that definitively or canonically articulate the rules. However, most
social rules are unformulated, and unformulated rules retain the same principal features and normative
forces as formulated rules. Moreover, unformulated rules can be formulated (albeit not authoritatively).
For example, we can say "men do not, as a rule, wear dresses," but we might also say "men should not
wear dresses" or "if a man wears a dress, he will be subjected to social opprobrium." We do not know
which of these (or any number of other plausible renderings) is the rendering that "correctly" captures
the prescription that exerts pressure on behavior such that men refrain from wearing dresses, as we have
no authority to mediate plausible alternative formulations. But we need not have an authoritative or
canonical formulation to either apply the rule in various contexts (e.g., by understanding how an
employer rule forbidding male employees from wearing dresses is not arbitrary) or to observe the rule in
various contexts (e.g., by not wearing a dress). See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 62-64, 71; see
also discussion of formulated and unformulated rules infra at Section II.A.
4 This Article does not offer a novel account of rule-following. Instead, it relies upon descriptive
accounts of the structure of rules and the phenomenon of rule-following advanced by others and begins
from a conditional premise: if these ideas about rule-following are correct, then these insights should
inform our understanding of the gender generalizations that form the predicates of sex-respecting legal
and employer rules. In particular, the arguments presented here rely upon an account of rule structures
and rule-based decision-making offered by Frederick Schauer in SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, and to
a lesser degree in FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES (2003)
[hereinafter PROFILES]. However, the phenomenology of rule-following has long been the subject of
study and debate among philosophers and social scientists. For a sample of some of the more influential
literature relating to rule-following, see GORDEN P. BAKER & P. M. S. HACKER, WIT-rGENSTEIN: RULES,
GRAMMAR AND NECESSITY (1985); DAVID BLOOR, WITrGENSTEIN, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS (1997);
GARY EBBS, RULE-FOLLOWING AND REALISM (1997); HART, supra note 2, at 9-11, 19-25, 125-154;
G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1807); SAUL KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND
PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953);
Lorenzo Bernasconi-Kohn, How Not to Think About Rules and Rule Following: A Response to Stueber,
36 PHIL. Soc. SCI. 86 (2006); Max Black, The Analysis of Rules, in MODELS AND METAPHORS (1984);
David Landy, Hegel's Account of Rule-Following, 51 INQUIRY 170 (2008); Norman Malcolm,
Wittgenstein on Language and Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHY 5 (1986); and Karsten R. Stueber, How to Think
About Rules and Rule Following, 35 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 307 (2005).
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arbitrary?5 If we do not find it arbitrary, it is because we are able to effortlessly
identify the rule's implicit factual predicate.6 A rule's implicit factual predicate
is the piece of information that causally links the expressed scope of the rule
(here, for example, the rule applies to all women) with the rule's purpose (for
example, meeting customers' expectations concerning employee apparel). To
understand the causal link between allowing only women to wear dresses and
the purpose of the rule (to satisfy expectations), we must be able to identify the
rule's implicit predicate: only women wear dresses. In this way, the implicit
factual predicate of the employer's rule is the piece of information that is
necessary to render the distinction drawn (men versus women) sensible.7
Indeed, the employer rule can only be justified (as non-arbitrary) in light of the
behavioral expectations that are generated by the widespread observation of the
social rule that forms the factual predicate of the employer rule.8 In this light,
the employer's rule is a particularized instantiation of the social rule's general
prescription: given that men do not wear dresses generally, men cannot wear
dresses here.9
This relationship between gender generalizations ("men do not wear
dresses")10 and sex-respecting rules ("men cannot wear dresses here, at this
workplace") has long been a subject of antidiscrimination law inquiry and has
generated a body of analysis that has principally revolved around the concept of
"stereotypes."" Courts and commentators have long recognized that the Equal
It is important to be clear that the question of whether the distinction is arbitrary is a different question
from whether the distinction is morally justified. See John Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, 64 PHIL. REV.
3 (1955).
6 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining that every rule has a factual predicate and that a
rule's factual predicate "may not be explicit at all").
7 id.
"Justified" here does not connote moral justification. See Rawls, supra note 5. When we speak of a
rule being justified, we usually mean either that the imperative of the rule is justified in light of its
purpose or that the purpose of the rule is justified. For example, a rule that poor citizens must live in a
particular district may be justified in light of its purpose (if the rule's purpose is ghettoizing poor
people), but we may still describe the rule as unjustified. In this, we mean that the purpose of the rule (or
the reason for having a rule at all) is not morally (or otherwise normatively) justified. On the other hand,
if the evil we seek to avoid is drunk driving, a rule that "no skateboards are allowed on the street" may
not be justified in light of that purpose. SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 26-27. When a rule is
described as "unjustified" in this discussion, the reader should assume the first connotation: that is, the
imperative of the rule is not justified in light of its purpose.
9 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 47-52 (discussing rules as entrenched generalizations).
1o The phrase "gender generalization," as it is used throughout the piece, includes all generalizations that
are based in or cognizant of sex, gender, or gendered qualities. There are distinctions to be made
between sex-based generalizations, gender-based generalizations, sex-cognizant generalizations, and so
forth, but these distinctions do not alter the arguments presented here. Therefore, in the interest of
simplicity, the phrase "gender generalization" is used to capture all the foregoing permutations.
1 The treatment of sex stereotypes in legal analysis is the subject of a diverse literature. For a
representative sample, see, for example SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4; Dianne Avery & Marion
Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face Of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 13 (2007); Katharine Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541 (1994); Ann Bartow,
Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes of Female Attorneys,
II WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221 (2005); Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype The Law
[Vol. 22:133136
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Protection Clause and Title VII both embody a commitment to a conception of
equality that is inconsistent with the legal enforcement of sex-respecting
classifications premised on "overbroad generalizations"' 2  or "fictional"
assumptions about men and women.14 Where a sex-respecting rule is deemed
Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest For Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1447 (2000); William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of the Ninth Circuit's Unequal
Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards Under Title VII, 84 N.C. L.
REv. 1357, 1360-62 (2006); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic Of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2000); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt &
Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.
L. & GENDER 461 (2007); Allegra C. Wiles, More Than Just a Pretty Face: Preventing the Perpetuation
ofSexual Stereotypes in the Workplace, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 657 (2007).
12 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975) (sex-respecting rule that favored female navel
officers did not violate the Due Process Clause because female officers had fewer opportunities for
promotion).
" City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (describing the difference between "real"
and "fictional" differences between men and women); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 507. To discover
whether a sex-respecting rule is premised on a stereotype, courts and commentators expressly
interrogate the rule's "assumptions." In Schlesinger, id., the Court described this process:
In both Reed and Frontiero the challenged classifications based on sex were premised on
overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated under the Constitution. In Reed, the
assumption underlying the Idaho statute was that men would generally be better estate
administrators than women. In Frontiero, the assumption underlying the Federal Armed
Services benefit statutes was that female spouses of servicemen would normally be
dependent upon their husbands, while male spouses of servicewomen would not.
14 Representative early cases that endorsed this proposition include: Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279
(1979) (striking down an Alabama statute requiring that alimony be paid to women but not men. The
Court found the statute to be unconstitutional, in part, because "[lI]egislative classifications which
distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the
stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection."); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 203 n. 14 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma's sex-differentiated drinking age statute
despite evidence that young men were more likely to be involved in drinking-related car accidents. The
Court stated "[t]he very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws ... are likely
substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative statistics. Hence, 'reckless' young men . . . are
transformed into arrest statistics whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.");
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975) (striking down a Utah statute that required child support for
male children up to the age of 21 while support was only extended to female children until the age of 18.
In Stanton, the Court identified the sex-differentiated rule's factual predicates as: (1) girls marry at a
younger age than boys, and (2) boys require support longer so they may educationally prepare to support
their own families. The Court then observed, "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and
the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas .... To
distinguish between the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female is not to be
supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and
bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.");
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (striking down a provision of the U.S. Code that
permitted a U.S. serviceman to claim his spouse as a "dependent" and obtain increased military benefits
without a showing of actual dependence but required a servicewoman to demonstrate actual dependence
when claiming her spouse as a "dependent"); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that an
Idaho statute that facially preferred men to women in the administration of estates violated the Equal
Protection Clause in that it gave "a mandatory preference to members of [one] sex over members of the
other" and thereby eliminated "hearings on the merits"). See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
For an overview of the treatment of the concept of "stereotype" in both the context of the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII, see Case, supra note 11, at 1463. Case argues that under both Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII analyses, a generalization that forms the predicate of a sex-respecting
rule is "over broad"-and therefore an impermissible stereotype-when the generalization is
nonuniversal.
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to be factually predicated on an impermissibly "broad" or "fictional"15
generalization about men or women, the rule is said to be based on "stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes," and the rule is disallowed. The linchpin of
this inquiry is the correct sorting of generalizations: every sex-respecting rule is
predicated on a generalization (as, indeed, every rule is),17 but not every gender
generalization is a stereotype.1 Therefore, the task of conventional sex-
stereotype analysis has traditionally been to identify when a gender
generalization is a stereotype (a "fictional" or "overbroad" distinction between
the sexes) and when it is not.' 9
However, while the project of identifying "sex stereotypes" has long been a
gender-equality touchstone and continues to be the analytic focal point of a
number of emerging norms in equal protection and statutory antidiscrimination
law,20 there is a troubling lack of consensus within the juridical and academic
communities regarding the criteria for identifying sex stereotypes.21 Three
dominant approaches to defining sex stereotypes have emerged. First, Mary
Anne Case has identified a "perfect proxy" approach to identifying sex
22
stereotypes. Case moors the legal definition of sex stereotype to the
categorical exclusion of women from opportunities or benefits. 23 In Case's
view, a gender generalization is a stereotype if it is nonuniversal (i.e., fails to
obtain in all instances) and the application of the rule would exclude women
from a class of benefits or opportunities.24 In contrast, Justice Scalia, among
others, has articulated a "false generalization" approach to identifying sex
stereotypes, which fixes the legal definition of "sex stereotype" solely upon
" Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708 (finding that a city department's requirement that female employees make
larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII, even though the
requirement was predicated on actuarial predictions regarding the life expectancy of women as
compared to men).
16 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685.
17 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 17-18.
" SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 17.
19 Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 507.
20 For example, sex-stereotyping theories have been advanced in equal protection challenges to state and
federal laws that restrict the definition of marriage to a man and woman. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2006); Andersen
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). For a discussion of the role that sex-stereotyping theories
have played in challenging same-sex marriage restrictions, see Deborah A. Widiss et al., supra note 11.
Similarly, the question of whether transgender discrimination is actionable under Title VII will
ultimately turn on a theory of sex stereotyping. Courts are presently split on the question of whether
transgendered plaintiffs may use a sex-stereotyping theory to advance Title VII claims. See, e.g., Barnes
v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
21 Mary Anne Case has described sex stereotype as a term of art within antidiscrimination analysis and
theory. Case, supra note 11, at 1449. The term "stereotype," as it has been used in this context, describes
something more than a nonuniversal generalization about men or women. After all, virtually no gender
generalization obtains in every case, yet not every gender generalization is a stereotype. Instead, the
term "stereotype" suggests a particular kind of generalization: a stereotype is an unfair generalization or,
more specifically in the context of legal discourse, a generalization which, when it serves as the factual
predicate of a sex-respecting employer or legal rule, renders the rule discriminatory.
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descriptive accuracy of the generalization itself.25 In Scalia's view, if the
gender generalization is statistically sound, the generalization is not a
stereotype, even if applying the generalization results in the categorical
exclusion of women.26
A third approach to defining sex stereotypes has been borne of difficulties
that arise when applying either of the first two approaches to assimilationist
rules (e.g., men must be masculine, and women must be feminine) rather than
27
exclusionary rules (e.g., only men need apply). Unlike exclusionary rules,
which exclude all women or men from a class of benefits or opportunities,
assimilationist rules require regulated individuals to alter their behavior to
comport with the gender generalizations that form the rules' predicates. For
example, a rule forbidding men to wear dresses at work requires male
employees to act in conformity with the rule's factual predicate (i.e., men do
not wear dresses).
Because assimilationist rules permit an individual to mold his or her
behavior to gendered norms rather than categorically exclude women (or men)
from jobs or benefits, the justice sensibilities of courts and commentators shift
in these contexts, and the malleable definition of "sex stereotype" bends to
meet this sensibility.28 Rather than focusing on the descriptive accuracy of the
generalization itself (e.g., is the proposition "men are masculine" spurious? Is it
universal?), courts and commentators have focused on the benefits and burdens
imposed by the challenged rule.29 Where the sex-respecting rule imposes too
great a burden on the regulated individual, the rule is found to be predicated on
a "stereotype." 30 On the other hand, where the burden imposed by the rule is
25 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 572-74 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 id.
27 For example, the informal workplace rule that was at issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was
assimilationist rather than exclusionary. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion). In reviewing Ann
Hopkins' application for partnership, a partner at Price Waterhouse communicated that the partnership
preferred that female employees behave "femininely." Hopkins was negatively evaluated for failing to
adhere to that informal rule. The rule at Price Waterhouse did not exclude women as a class from a
category of employment (i.e., it was not that rule that only men could become partners). Instead, women
at Price Waterhouse were asked to adhere to a specific gendered norm, while men at Price Waterhouse
were asked to adhere to a different norm. See infra Section IC. and note 116 (discussing Price
Waterhouse).
28 Assimilationist rules may require adherence to more than broad notions of masculinity or femininity;
they frequently require adherence to caricatures of masculinity or femininity. See, e.g., Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (involving rule that employees
adopt a hyper-feminized presentation at work by teasing their hair and wearing specific kinds of
makeup). See infra Section I.C.I. and Part III.
29 See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109-10.
3o See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a male-to-female
transsexual firefighter who alleged that she was discriminated against in her employment for exhibiting
"feminine" behaviors and appearance stated an actionable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII;
the court specifically noted that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder); Rene v.
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane) (plurality opinion) (plaintiffs claim of
sex discrimination under Title VII could go forward where plaintiff produced evidence that he was
singled out for sexual harassment by members of his own sex; the court held that the fact that plaintiff
was gay was irrelevant to the sex discrimination analysis).
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adjudged reasonable in light of the rule's benefit, the fact that the rule is
predicated on a nonuniversal-and, therefore, potentially "over broad"-
gender generalization becomes immaterial.31
The combination of these three context-specific and consequence-based
approaches to defining sex stereotypes has created uncertainty not only about
which generalizations constitute stereotypes, but also, more importantly, about
why gender generalizations are uniquely unjust or "discriminatory" as
compared to other kinds of generalizations. 32
To illustrate this point, consider the factual predicate of the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) policy of admitting only men.33 In defending its
admission rule against an equal protection challenge, VMI pointed to evidence
that women were less likely to succeed in the type of adversarial educational
environment that VMI provided.3 4 According to VMI's experts, a non-spurious
and nonuniversal generalization 3 5 about women formed the factual predicate of
VMI's exclusionary admission policy: some women may be able to succeed at
VMI, but most women-if VMI's evidence was to be believed-would not. 3 6
In this light, in excluding women candidates, VMI merely drew a probabilistic
distinction that was causally related to its purported goal of limiting admission
to cadets who are most likely to succeed at VMI.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming VMI's
evidence were true, VMI's rule-predicate that "most women will not succeed at
VMI" was insufficient to justify VMI's sex classification. In articulating the
insufficiency of the gender generalization that "most women will not succeed at
VMI," Justice Ginsburg objected to the fact that the rule failed to provide an
31 See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
32 More specifically, there is uncertainty about why the use of these particular generalizations as rule-
predicates is discriminatory. See, e.g., SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 17 ("But if stereotyping is
wrong ... we have ... ambiguity about whether stereotyping is wrong only when the stereotype lacks
any statistical foundation, or whether it is wrong also when [statistically sound] stereotypes ... are used
to make decisions about entire classes. . . ."); see also DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION
WRONG? 43 (2008) (describing the makeup requirement at issue in Jespersen as one of a "whole set of
stereotypes about women" that are "wrong" in the discrimination sense insofar as they denigrate
women).
33 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
3 Id. at 540-41.
3
sA nonuniversal generalization may be statistically relevant but fail to obtain in every case. In contrast,
an example of a universal generalization is Socrates' declaration that all men are mortal. The statement
describes an attribute that is true as applied in all cases. A universal generalization may still be used in a
fallacious manner (for example, "we should hire a woman instead of a man because all men are mortal,"
which falsely implies that women are not mortal), but this is a different type of logical error than that
which follows from the application of a nonuniversal generalization (of which stereotypes are a subset)
to a particular person or all people in a group. For a helpful explanation of the difference between
universal and nonuniversal generalizations, see SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 27-48.
36 VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-41.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 550.
[Vol. 22:133140
Gender Rules
opportunity for extraordinary women to defy, with their individual and
particular strengths, the strictures of the general.
Ginsburg's objection is intuitively appealing and may tempt us towards the
conclusion that nonuniversality is the key to stereotyping analysis.40 We might
conclude, as Mary Anne Case does, that all nonuniversal generalizations that
exclude women (or men) are "stereotypes" and therefore discriminatory. 1 But
Ginsburg's objection is also not unique. If, for example, VMI's exclusionary
policy were predicated on another kind of probabilistic generalization--one
that did not distinguish along gender lines-the rule would have been
42
allowed. After all, VMI is permitted to exclude individuals who are too
young, who lack the requisite academic qualifications, or whose physical
infirmities would-in VMI's probabilistic assessment-prevent success at
VMI. 4 3 Undoubtedly, each of the generalizations that form the factual
predicates of these exclusionary rules is also over-inclusive. 44 Some members
of each of the classes excluded (children, individuals with poor academic
records, individuals who are infirm) are capable of succeeding at VMI, yet
these individuals are not permitted an opportunity to defy the generalizations
that exclude them. VMI is permitted to exclude these individuals based on a
generalized rather than individualized judgment about their capabilities as long
as those generalizations seem non-arbitrary (i.e., the generalization describes a
state of the world with an acceptable degree of accuracy and is causally linked
to the justification for the rule) and not gendered.45
What makes the VMI majority's use of "sex stereotype" even more
perplexing is the fact that all rules are predicated on nonuniversal
46generalizations. As Frederick Schauer has explained, the factual predicate of
every rule (including all legal rules, employer rules, and college admission
rules) is a generalization that fails to obtain in every case. 47 Rules are, by
nature, over- and under-inclusive.48 Rules govern the general case and eschew
individualized considerations.49 Because it is impossible to make an admissions
or employment rule without relying on generalities, we tolerate over- and
under-inclusive generalizations about young people, poor test-takers, and a
slew of other imperfect proxies. 50 Where the reliance on a nonuniversal
3 Id. ("Estimates of what is appropriate for most women no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description.").
40 id.
41 See Case, supra note 11, at 1457.
42 Most commentators would agree that the animus-based exclusion of women is not a legitimate
purpose for a sex-respecting rule.
43 See SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 149.
" See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 31-34.
45 See SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 149.
46 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 17-18.
47 id.
48 Id. at 31-34; SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 45-46.
49 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 31-34.
50 Id
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generalization seems justified by the strength of the causal link between the
predictive power of the generalization (e.g., "students with low SAT scores will
not succeed") and the legitimate evil the rule seeks to avoid (e.g., admitting
applicants who will not succeed), we are inclined to tolerate the fact that some
individuals who are capable of succeeding at VMI are excluded "unfairly" by
its admissions rules. 5 1 Why, then, do we not have the same tolerance for a rule
that excludes the subset of women who are capable of succeeding at VMI? 5 2
Here, conventional antidiscrimination analysis falters. The VMI question
illustrates that rules that are predicated on gender generalizations (e.g., "most
women will not succeed at VMI") often run afoul of both our justice-
conceptions and antidiscrimination law, even where they might be descriptively
(i.e., statistically) accurate and therefore reasonably helpful predictors of the
evil the rule seeks to avoid. And, more significantly, the source of this
objection must be something more than simply the fact that the generalization
fails to obtain in every case (thereby denying the exceptional woman her due)
because every rule is predicated on a generalization that fails to obtain in every
case. So what then is special about gender generalizations, and how do we
know which gender generalizations are stereotypes?
This Article offers two answers to this question. First, it observes that
attempts at sorting generalizations into permissible probabilistic assessments
and impermissible "sex stereotypes" are analytically unhelpful. The Article
demonstrates that the idea of "sex stereotype" is itself conceptually empty.
Rather than using "stereotype" as a substantive standard, analysts have used the
term "stereotype" as a heuristic for capturing judgments about the justness of
applying gender generalizations in particular contexts. However, the heuristic
has failed to provide criteria for distinguishing "stereotyping" generalizations
from other types of generalizations, and therefore it is not helpful in performing
its primary function: sorting discriminatory rules from nondiscriminatory rules.
The second, and primary, insight of this Article offers an explanation for
the failure of the stereotype heuristic. The argument holds that while
antidiscrimination law and theory have been rhetorically attentive to the
descriptive dimensions of gender generalizations, both doctrine and theory in
this area have been substantively driven by a suspicion of or discomfort with
the prescriptive dimensions of gender generalizations. This misalignment has
led to confusion over both the application of and justification for the legal rule
against using sex stereotypes as predicates for employer or legal rules.
This Article clarifies this considerable confusion by explicating two under-
theorized phenomena: (1) the manner in which gender generalizations function
prescriptively; and (2) the manner in which the use of gender generalizations as
rule-predicates limits the revisability of those generalizations while reinforcing




their prescriptive dimensions. The Article concludes that these phenomena are
what lie at the center of antidiscrimination law and theory's objection to
"discriminatory assumptions" and "stereotyped distinctions" between the sexes,
and therefore these phenomena should be at the center of future analysis.
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the current method
of using the stereotype heuristic to assess gender generalizations as rule-
predicates and demonstrates how the heuristic fails. Next, Part II identifies and
analyzes the prescriptive dimensions of gender generalizations. Finally, Part III
considers the role that these prescriptive dimensions play in rendering gender
generalizations objectionable as predicates for employer or legal rules.
I. THE EMPTY IDEA OF STEREOTYPES
It is not difficult to arrive at an intuitive understanding of the term
"stereotype"-we know that it is a type of generalization that concerns qualities
or attributes assigned to a category of people.53 We know too that a stereotype
is an "unfair" or "unjust" generalization: one that has either a spurious
predicate (e.g., "women are bad drivers"), or-and this is the trickier case-it is
a generalization that captures something that is generally, or sometimes, or
even usually "true" about the category of people that it describes, but the
application of the generalization in a particular context is still somehow
objectionable or unfair.
For example, the generalization that women with young children miss
work to care for children more often than men with young children may be
statistically sound, but it does not obtain in all cases, and we would likely
describe it as a "stereotype" if it served as the factual predicate of a legal rule
that permitted employers to decline to hire women (but not men) with young
children. Our objection in that context would be that a rule limiting the options
of women with young children based on a nonuniversal and categorical
generalization is unfair, even if the rule's predicate is statistically supported.54
However, are we invoking a stereotype when we point to evidence that
supports the generalization and then draw conclusions from it? If this
s3 For a general discussion of the concept of "stereotype" in the context of sex discrimination, see
SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 131-54.
54 In contrast, we would not think it unfair for an employer to decline to hire a particular applicant with a
history of job absenteeism or to dismiss an employee who missed work frequently. It would seem that
what we find objectionable is the application of a generalization to the broader category of people for
whom it may or may not obtain. Schauer would thus describe the nature of this objection as a kind of
"particularlism"-a reflection of the belief that:
mak[ing] decisions on the basis of the characteristics of particular ... individuals, rather than
on the basis of the characteristics of the groups or classes of which the particular
[individuals] may be members, is ... a moral imperative. Indeed it is often thought to define
the concept of justice, and justice has long been thought to reside in particulars.
ScHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 19-20. See also Case, supra note II (making the case that the
Supreme Court embraces the view that fairness in the context of sex-respecting rules requires
individualized decision-making).
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generalization formed the factual predicate of a legal rule granting benefits to
women with young children in order to decrease absenteeism, would the
generalization, in that context, be considered a stereotype? Can a generalization
with the same propositional content be a stereotype in one context but not in
another?
The preceding example suggests that it is difficult to determine whether a
gender generalization is a "stereotype" without reference to the fairness of a
particular application of the generalization. This is because the idea of a
stereotype carries with it a connotation of unfairness or injustice, but it does not
delimit or offer specific guidance about the type of unfairness that transforms a
garden-variety nonuniversal generalization into a stereotype.56 Thus, to
determine whether a generalization is a stereotype, an analyst or adjudicator
must first be committed to a principle of justice by which the "fairness" of the
application of the generalization can be measured. Only after a justice principle
has been embraced can a generalization be evaluated as both (1) nonuniversal
and (2) otherwise unfair. 57
Seen in this light, the concept of "stereotype" begins to seem like an empty
idea. 8 To determine whether it applies, we must first have an affirmative
principle of justice; then, if a particular generalization fails to meet the criteria
set out by the justice principle we embrace, that generalization is a stereotype.
If the generalization is a stereotype, it is disallowed. In this iteration, the
concept of "stereotype" is not doing any analytic work: a generalization is
either just or unjust as applied, and if it is unjust, it is disallowed.
If it is indeed the case that "stereotype" is an empty standard, it should
come as no surprise that courts and commentators have adopted diverse and
idiosyncratic methods for identifying "sex stereotypes." 59 Of these varied
5 It is difficult to understand generalizations to be unfair on their own terms. They are primarily fair or
unfair, just or unjust, as applied in particular contexts. Excepted from this statement are generalizations
that have spurious factual predicates (e.g., "women are bad drivers").
56 SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 2-3.
57 Ideas vary about what renders the application of a generalization "otherwise unfair." Sometimes
application of a nonuniversal generalization is deemed "otherwise unfair" because it is perceived to be
spurious or statistically unsound, while other times it is perceived to be unfair because it offends a
commitment to particularism. See SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 19-21.
5 The phrase "empty idea" is an allusion to Peter Westen's provocative article, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). In this piece, Westen argues that "equality" is an empty idea in
that before one can determine how to obey the Aristotelian directive to "treat likes alike," one must first
refer to external values to decide which people are alike and which treatments constitute "like
treatment[s]." Id. at 571-72. However, after one has settled on a value to determine which people and
treatments are alike, that value becomes the reason or justification for the "equal" treatment. Thus, the
concept of "equality" is not doing any work in the analysis: likes are to be treated alike because of the
way in which they are alike, not because of a substantive concept of equality. But see Steven J. Burton,
Comment on "Empty Ideas": Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136
(1982).
' It should also come as no surprise that these diverse methodologies have produced inconsistent-and
at times even bizarre-results. Consider, for example the observation of Richard Posner, concurring in a
recent sex-stereotyping decision:
The [7th Circuit] case law as it has evolved holds ... that although Title VII does not protect
homosexuals from discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation, it protects
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approaches, three are particularly prominent. First, courts originally were (at
least rhetorically) concerned with generalizations that had spurious factual
predicates (e.g., "women are bad drivers"), and some commentators continue to
embrace the idea that only statistically unsound generalizations are sex
stereotypes. 60 Second, as Mary Anne Case has observed, some courts have
embraced a "perfect proxy" definition of stereotype that holds all nonuniversal
gender generalizations to be stereotypes where the application of the
generalization would categorically exclude women from a class of
opportunities or benefits. However, as mentioned above, each of these
approaches has been the subject of critiques that are particularly salient in the
context of sex-respecting assimilationist rules (e.g., rules that require women to
behave femininely and men to behave masculinely).
In fact, because neither the "false generalization" nor the "perfect proxy"
approach provides a helpful framework in the context of assimilationist rules,
courts and commentators have adopted a third approach to assessing sex-
respecting rule-predicates in those contexts. Where a sex-respecting rule
requires assimilation (rather than compels exclusion), courts have largely
retained the rhetoric of the stereotype heuristic, while actually applying a
balancing of equities approach to determine whether the rule is discriminatory.
Each of these methods of defining "sex stereotype"-the "false
generalization" approach, the "perfect proxy" approach, and the "balancing-of-
equities" approach-is considered below.
A. "False Generalizations"
Initially, in identifying discriminatory sex-respecting rule-predicates,
courts and commentators were interested in identifying generalizations that
were not predicated on a "true" state of the world but that instead reflected the
widespread observation of social rules that had the effect of segregating women
into a discrete and subordinate behavioral realm. Implicit in these early
decisions was the belief that social rules were constructing a "fictional" account
of women's nature and abilities and that these false generalizations about
women were disqualifying women from opportunities they might otherwise be
equal to. Therefore, the first strike at gender generalizations was directed at
heterosexuals who are victims of "sex stereotyping" or "gender stereotyping." . . . [T]his
curious distinction ... would be very difficult to explain to a lay person. [T]he absurd
conclusion follows that the law protects effeminate men from employment discrimination,
but only if they are (or are believed to be) heterosexuals. To impute such a distinction to the
authors of Title VII is to indulge in a most extravagant legal fiction. It is also to saddle the
courts with the making of distinctions that are beyond the practical capacity of the litigation
process.
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
6See, e.g., United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 540-44 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 See Case, supra note 11, at 1457.
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these "false generalizations." The following Sections discuss this method of
defining sex stereotype as well as the degree to which this method still
animates sex-stereotyping doctrine and theory.
1. Early Rule-Predicate Analysis
Early in the development of modem sex discrimination doctrine, 6 2 both
courts and commentators began using the term "stereotype" to criticize the
factual predicates of a subset of employer and legal rules that drew distinctions
between men and women that were rooted in nonuniversal generalizations
about each sex. For example, in 1978 the Supreme Court observed:
There are both real and fictional differences between women and men.
It is true that the average man is taller than the average woman; it is
not true that the average woman driver is more accident prone than the
average man. . . . It is now well recognized that employment decisions
cannot be predicated on mere "stereotyped" impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. . . . In forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes. 63
Thus, in assessing the potentially discriminatory components of a sex-
respecting employer rule, courts first identified the rule's factual predicate and
then assessed whether the predicate fell into one of two categories: (1) spurious
and thereby impermissible gender generalizations (i.e., "the average woman
driver is more accident prone than the average man");64 and (2) gender
generalizations that courts deemed non-fictional or "true" (i.e., "the average
man is taller than the average woman").65
In this spirit, the Supreme Court struck down a series of legal and employer
rules predicated, in the Court's view, on "gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes." 66 These early sex-stereotyping cases generally involved the
categorical exclusion of men or women from particular benefits or
opportunities. For example, an airline rule was invalidated that required
stewardesses to be female and pursers, who received greater benefits, including
62 The phrase "modem sex discrimination doctrine" is used to signify both Equal Protection and Title
VII doctrines beginning with the period following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act. After the Civil
Rights Act was enacted, courts systematically revised the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause in light
of the definition of sex discrimination that was established by the Act. See Case, supra note I1, at 1463
(describing the relationship between Title ViI's anti-sex stereotyping mandate and the reinterpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause).
63 City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978) (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 707.
6
s id.
6 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973); see also Case, supra note 11.
67 See also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991(1971)
(holding that an airline's policy of employing married men but not married women violated Title VII
and that 29 CFR § 1604.3(a), presently 29 CFR § 1604.4, was reasonable and consistent with Title VII).
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a cleaning allowance, to be male.68 The airline attempted to justify the male-
only cleaning allowance by appealing to a widely-held belief about men and
women: men and women enjoy different relationships to domesticity.69
In evaluating the legal and employer rules in these early sex-stereotyping
cases, courts focused on the "assumptions" of the rules in question-by which
courts meant the rules' factual predicates (e.g., women have a special affinity
with or relationship to domesticity).70 If the assumptions reflected "archaic" or
"false" gender generalizations (which courts broadly described as
"stereotypes"), the assumption was deemed insufficient to justify the sex
classification, and the sex-respecting rule was invalidated.n
However, there were two difficulties with this early "false generalization"
approach. First, it was an uncomfortable and largely unmanageable project for
courts to sift spurious gender generalizations from "true" generalizations based
solely on judicial intuitions.72 In these early rule-predicate cases, courts
stopped short of using the epistemological tools of trial (i.e., the presentation of
evidence) to determine whether the gender generalization that formed the
predicate of a contested rule was "true."73 Instead, courts described gender
68 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
69 Id. This factual predicate-that women and men are differently situated with respect to issues
surrounding domesticity-is typical of the kind of "stereotypical" predicates that courts chastised in
these early cases.
7o In a related line of cases, courts were asked to evaluate practices in which customers' purportedly
stereotypical preferences were offered as the reason for (or justification of) a sex-differentiated practice.
For example, in this context courts were asked to pass upon an airline's policy of hiring only female
flight attendants and requiring them to dress in sexually provocative uniforms. Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In these cases, courts focused on the insufficiency of
the reason for the distinction (customers' preference) as a justification for the exclusionary hiring
practice.
7 See supra note 67.
72 Courts, though, have not universally bowed before the challenge; indeed, Judge Posner continues to
articulate his intuition-driven views regarding the spuriousness of gender generalizations.
[I]f a fire department refused to hire mannish women to be firefighters, this would be
evidence that it was discriminating against women, because mannish women are more likely
than stereotypically feminine women to meet the demanding physical criteria for a
firefighter.
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., 332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). It is not
clear from the context what Judge Posner holds to be the causal link between what he describes as
"mannish" women and physical strength. One might assume that he means "mannish" to indicate
gender-nonconforming women. It may be that Judge Posner believes gender-nonconforming women to
be physically larger than gender-conforming women. In any event, it seems clear that Judge Posner
perceives that generalizations which draw causal links between femininity and relative physical
weakness to be sound. In the same concurrence, Judge Posner observes that "mannish women are
disliked by some men because they are suspected of being lesbians and by other men merely because
they are not attractive to those men; a further complication is that men are more hostile to male
homosexuality than they are to lesbianism"-all of which suggests that an evaluation of the spuriousness
gender generalizations should not be committed solely to judicial intuitions. Id. at 1066.
73 Justice Scalia, however, has proposed that the determination of the validity of a gender-based
distinction should be consigned to a fact-finder reviewing evidence, rather than a legal standard or
judicial intuition. United States v. Virginia (VM1), 518 U.S. 515, 572-74 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth ofthe Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U.L. REv. 1769
(2003).
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generalizations as spurious "stereotypes" based on judicial intuitions about the
content of the generalization itself.
More significantly, however, an examination of these cases reveals that
courts' conclusions about the permissibility of a rule's factual predicate turned
not on scrutiny of the content of the generalization in terms of its truth or
falseness, but on the fairness of applying the generalization in particular
contexts. While retaining a formal reliance on "false generalization" rhetoric,
courts in practice were defining "stereotype" in light of the consequences of
applying the generalization. If the rule was predicated on a nonuniversal gender
generalization and application of the rule resulted in the categorical exclusion
of women from a particular opportunity or benefit, the rule's predicate was
deemed a "stereotype." In other words, courts were applying a justice-based
standard rather than assessing the validity or accuracy of the rule's predicate.
Within this methodology, the empty vessel of "stereotype" was filled with a
conception of justice that held it unfair to categorically exclude women from
benefits and opportunities when the gender generalization applied only to some
but not all women.
This method resulted in an uneven application of the sex-stereotype
standard. Courts attached the label of "stereotype" to generalizations which
categorically excluded women, even if there was reason to believe the
generalizations were statistically supported,74 while tacitly approving more
questionable predicates in other contexts. Thus, although courts were formally
defining "stereotypes" as generalizations that were in some manner "untrue" or
spurious, in practice courts were using the appellation "stereotype" to chastise
generalizations that may or may not be statistically supported but were, in the
courts' estimation, unfair as applied.75
This tension between the rhetoric of "false generalizations" and the justice-
based method that courts used to define "sex stereotype" increased as the
doctrine developed. After a first wave of cases which dealt with clearly
spurious rule-predicates, courts were increasingly called upon to evaluate sex
classifications that were predicated on generalizations that were neither clearly
76
spurious (e.g., women drivers) nor clearly "true" (e.g., tall men). As more
gender stereotyping cases were brought and decided, the metrics by which the
"accuracy" of gender generalizations could be assessed grew increasingly
74 In these early sex-stereotyping cases-particularly in the context of Equal Protection cases-courts
were not moved to permit categorical exclusions even in instances in which defendants defended the
statistical accuracy of a practice's factual predicate. For example, in Manhart, the city unsuccessfully
defended its practice of requiring women to make more pension contributions than men by pointing to
the fact that women live longer than men. This disparate treatment, in the city's view, was not predicated
on "myths" or spurious notions of what men and women are like, but on an actual, "true" difference
between men and women. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978). See Case,
supra note II (describing how Equal Protection has never been satisfied by sex stratification that is
justified solely with reference to statistical truths).
7 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
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elusive, and courts were forced to rely on idiosyncratic justice-based judgments
about what constitutes a "false generalization.""
2. "False Generalizations" Re-imagined
Perhaps the apex of the method of defining "stereotype" in light of the
justness of its application in the context of categorical exclusions was reached
in United States v. Virginia, which, as described above, challenged a policy
excluding women from admission to VMI. In this challenge, female applicants
argued that VMI's exclusion of women was predicated on two over-inclusive
generalizations: (1) that women were generally ill-suited to the adversarial
educational style employed by the VMI; and (2) that most women would not
choose to attend VMI given its adversarial pedagogical style. 79 VMI defended
its exclusionary policy by providing expert testimony that "females tend to
thrive in a cooperative atmosphere" and that, although some women may prefer
the adversarial educational style offered by VMI, most women were unlikely to
prefer such a method.80 Thus, in defending its practice against the plaintiffs'
charge, VMI asserted that the admittedly nonuniversal sex-respecting
generalizations that formed the factual predicate of its rule were in fact
"true"-meaning they were grounded in a reasonably accurate picture of the
world.81 VMI disputed that its rule was predicated on a sex stereotype in that
VMI understood stereotypes to be limited to those nonuniversal generalizations
that are spurious.82 In VMI's view, it was not discriminatory for VMI to
exclude women based on a statistically accurate picture that women were
unlikely to succeed at VMI.81
While the majority held that VMI's sex-respecting rule violated the Equal
Protection Clause, VMI's analysis found a friend in Justice Scalia. Justice
Scalia agreed with VMI's argument that the definition of "sex stereotype"
excludes statistically sound generalizations. 84 In his dissent, Scalia suggested
that he would draw a distinction between exclusionary rules that are predicated
on "bad old days" spurious generalizations designed to "keep women in their
place" and rules that are predicated on rationally-drawn generalizations that
7 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
78 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996). For a history of the case, see Philippa Strum,
WOMEN IN THE BARRACKS: THE VMI CASE AND EQUAL RIGHTS (2002).
9 518 U.S. at 540.
8 Id. at 540-44. For an analysis of the "real" difference testimony in VMI, see Diane Avery, Institutional
Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia
Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 189 (1996).
" 518 U.S. at 540-44.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 549. The Commonwealth embraced the Task Force view, as did expert witnesses who testified
for Virginia. See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 480-81 (W.D. Va. 1994)
"' 518 U.S. at 572-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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accurately reflect states of the world.85 Moreover, in Scalia's rendering, the
evaluation of whether a generalization is rational or spurious is an empirical
rather than a legal or conceptual question. To sort the spurious chaff from the
rational wheat, Scalia would rely upon the epistemological procedures of
trial.86 Where the adversarial process reveals that the generalization is
statistically sound, Scalia would hold that the generalization is not a stereotype
and the application of the generalization is not discriminatory.87
Thus, Scalia's VMI dissent articulated his method for defining "sex
stereotype": he would identify a sex-respecting rule's gender-generalization
predicate and permit the rule to stand where a fact-finder determines the
generalization to be sound.88 In this way, Scalia's definition of "sex stereotype"
echoed courts' early "false generalization" rhetoric-although decidedly not
courts' "false generalization" methodology. Whereas earlier courts
disallowed even statistically sound generalizations if the application of those
generalizations resulted in categorical exclusions, Scalia would allow the
categorical exclusion if the generalization is not spurious.90
Scalia's departure from previous courts' method of defining "stereotype" is
not rooted in a disagreement about what constitutes a spurious (as opposed to
sound) generalization. It is based instead on a disagreement about what justice
requires in the application of a nonuniversal generalization that categorically
excludes women from opportunities. While earlier courts were committed to a
justice principle that provided individual women the opportunity to defy
generalizations (regardless of whether they obtained in most cases), Scalia is
committed to a justice principle that would allow lawmakers and employers to
draw broad sex-respecting distinctions where those distinctions are predicated
on "true" generalizations about men and women, where truth is determined by
the epistemological procedures of trial.
However, the "false generalizations" approach that Scalia embraces has
proven vulnerable to criticism. First, while Scalia's approach provides a
method for distinguishing permissible rule-predicates from impermissible rule-
predicates, it fails to categorize as "impermissible" the class of generations that
earlier courts disallowed not because they were spurious but because they were
"overly broad." As Mary Anne Case observed in her critique of Scalia's VMI
dissent, "[e]ven a generalization demonstrably true of an overwhelming
85 Id. at 591. In particular, Justice Scalia emphasized that the trial record supported the rationality of
VMI's generalization concerning the fitness of women to meet VMI's instructional requirements. Justice
Scalia observed, "[i]t is worth noting that none of the United States' own experts in the remedial phase
of this litigation was willing to testify that VMI's adversative method was an appropriate methodology
for educating women."








majority of one sex or the other [has not satisfied the Court in the past]:
virtually every sex-respecting rule struck down by the Court in the last quarter
century embodied a proxy that was overwhelmingly, though not perfectly,
accurate."92 Thus, Scalia's method of identifying sex stereotypes fails to
capture-and indeed is inconsistent with-the justice-based judgments that
early courts sought to apply by adopting the stereotype heuristic. 93
In particular, Scalia's "false generalization" approach fails to incorporate
the express judgment within courts' early rule-predicate analysis that if past
"discrimination" has created a gendered regularity, it is unjust to allow an
employer or legal rule to exploit or enforce that regularity. This judgment was
established early in the Court's "sex stereotypes" doctrine in cases in which
women's relative lack of educational qualifications or relative poverty was used
as the basis of sex-respecting rules. For example, in Reed v. Reed, the Court
struck down an Idaho statute that preferred men to women in the administration
of estates, even though, as Schauer notes, the rule was likely premised on the
statistically sound generalization that a woman in Idaho was less likely than a
man to have the requisite "understanding of accounting[,] . .. familiarity with
the world of investments, and general knowledge of business" to be a
competent estate administrator.94 Because past discrimination played a role in
creating the regularity that the generalization captures (i.e., women are less
educated than men in business matters), the Court was presumably disinclined
to allow Idaho to reinforce that regularity with its sex-respecting rule.95
But what does it mean to say that a gendered regularity is the product of
past "discrimination"? Surely it would be reductive to state that the gendered
differences in knowledge and experience that render the Idaho estate-
administrator rule non-arbitrary were caused solely by dejure discrimination.96
Further, no causal link to past de jure discrimination is required for courts to
find that these types of gender generalizations are insufficient rule-predicates,
even if they are statistically accurate. Therefore, embodied in courts' early rule-
predicate analysis is the judgment that the unacceptability of a gender
generalization as a sex-respecting rule-predicate is tied to the prescriptive
forces that create the regularity of behavior-the generalization describes, even
where those prescriptive forces almost certainly include adherence to non-legal
rules such as rules about gender roles and the appropriateness of women in
business. 97 In fact, courts have consistently declined to reinforce the
92 Case, supra note 11, at 1450.
9 518 U.S. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 139.
9 Similarly, courts have been disinclined to allow a sex-respecting rule to stand where its factual
predicate is based on a regularity created by past discrimination against women, even where the sex-
respecting rule favors women. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) (striking down a statute
that would allow only women to receive alimony).
9 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute that facially preferred men to women
in the administration of estates violated the Equal Protection Clause).
97 id.
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prescriptive dimensions of generalizations such as the one supporting Idaho's
rule, even though the generalizations are descriptively valid.98 Scalia's "false
generalization" approach to assessing rule-predicates would exclude this
judgment.
Thus, Scalia's "false generalization" approach is inconsistent with the
justice commitments of the earlier courts' stereotype heuristic, particularly in
that it would exclude spurious rule-predicates but allow rule-predicates which
reinforce gendered regularities that are themselves the product of suspect
prescriptive forces.
B. A Perfect Proxy
Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion in VMI, and her opinion
adopted a posture with the early sex-stereotyping cases that was the mirror
image of Scalia's.99 While Scalia rhetorically embraced the false generalization
standard but rejected the attendant justice-based method for assigning
"falseness," Ginsburg's opinion embraced the justice principle from early cases
but abandoned the rhetoric of "false generalization."loo In finding that VMI's
sex-respecting rule was based on impermissible generalizations about women,
Ginsburg stated that even assuming that most women would not succeed at
VMI, that fact does not justify "denying opportunity to women whose talent
and capacity place them outside the average description."101 In other words, if
VMI's rule was based on a generalization about women, the generalization
must either apply universally to all women or VMI had to provide an
opportunity for extraordinary women to defy the generalization.102
Mary Anne Case has persuasively described Ginsburg's analytic move as
consistent with the Court's previous evaluations of sex-respecting rules that
categorically exclude women. 0 3 Case observed that VMI is in many ways an
"easy" sex-stereotyping case in that it fits squarely within the Court's implicit
understanding that "stereotype" has become a term of art by which is simply
meant any imperfect proxy or any overbroad generalization. That is to say, the
assumption at the root of the sex-respecting rule must be true of either all
women or no women (or all men or no men)."l 04 Case has further observed that
courts have consistently disallowed gender generalizations that represent not
9 See Case, supra note 11, at 1449-53.
9 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
10 Id
'0 Id. at 550. For a critical assessment of the Court's rejection of VMI's defense of its rule based on
"real" or "true" sex difference as demonstrated by statistical evidence, see Kimberly Schuld, Rethinking
Educational Equity: Sometimes, Diferent Can Be an Acceptable Substitute for Equal, U. CHI. LEGAL F.
461, 469 (1999).
102 See SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 131-54.
103 Case, supra note 11, at 1452.
'4 Id. at 1449.
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only imperfect proxies, but also "outdated normative stereotypes," a conclusion
that returns us to the original problem: what makes a generalization a
stereotype? 05 It surely cannot be the fact that the generalization is
nonuniversal, since virtually all generalizations (and therefore all rule-
predicates) are nonuniversal. 0 6
Case is correct that VMI merely made explicit what had long been implicit
in the Court's analyses, but she is mistaken about what the case exposed
"lurking ... just below the surface of the [Court's stereotyping] decisions." 0 7
Rather than revealing that the Court implicitly favors an "overbroad" definition
of stereotype rather than a "false generalization" definition, as Case suggests,
VMI reveals that the Court's attention long ago shifted from the descriptive
accuracy of stereotypes (if, indeed, descriptive accuracy was ever an animating
concern) and towards a less bounded assessment of whether the application of a
sex-respecting rule is just. The rule-predicate in VMI, while nonuniversal, is not
disallowed because it is nonuniversal (or virtually all rule-predicates would be
discriminatory), nor is it disallowed because the generalization ("most women
would not succeed at VMI") is "outdated." It is disallowed because, in the
Court's view, it is unfair to apply the generalization in this context. Why it is
unfair, however, is a question that is no more satisfactorily resolved by
Ginsburg's "perfect proxy" rationale than it is adequately addressed by Scalia's
"false generalization" approach.
Thus, while stereotyping analysis in the exclusion context was relatively
simple to administer in situations in which the factual predicate of the
challenged rule was clearly spurious (or at least in the Court's view represented
more "myth" than reality), the appropriate role for stereotyping analysis
became less clear in cases such as VMI, in which it is not obvious that the sex-
specific generalizations can be described as "fictional," nor is it obvious that
the generalizations are uniquely "over broad." To wriggle free from these
conceptual difficulties, courts and commentators retained the rhetoric of
"stereotyping" while infusing the legal heuristic with sufficient conceptual
elasticity to encompass an ever-broadening range of intuitions about the
justness of gendered rules.
C. Stereotypes in the Assimilation Context
At the same time that courts and commentators were moving their analytic
focus away from the spuriousness or universality of rule-predicates in the
context of categorical exclusions, courts were increasingly called upon to
evaluate a second category of sex-stereotyping claims. These claims were
'0 Id. at 1450.
'" ScHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 1-25.
107 Case, supra note 11, at 1448-50.
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based not on the categorical exclusion of men or women from a particular
benefit or opportunity but were instead directed at employer rules that required
employees to exhibit gender-conforming sets of behaviors. In these cases,
courts were asked to evaluate whether employers were permitted to penalize
employees for failing to adhere to "stereotypical" notions of how men and
women should behave.
This category of claims first met with the "stereotype" standard in the
Supreme Court in 1989.1os In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,109 the Court
announced that a sex-stereotyping theory that challenges an employer's
requirement that employees adhere to conventional sex-specific behavioral
rules (i.e., that men behave in a manner that is consistent with masculinity and
that women behave in a manner that is consistent with femininity) can form the
basis of a sex discrimination claim cognizable under Title VII.I10 The Court
stated:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes." I1
Thus, in language harvested from the early sex-stereotyping cases, the
Court reiterated that disparate treatment that results from sex stereotyping is
discriminatory and that such discrimination occurs when employers negatively
evaluate employees for failing to match stereotypes associated with their
1os Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
9 Id.
no Id. at 251. The decision resolves a Title VII claim brought by Ann Hopkins in which she claimed,
inter alia, that Price Waterhouse failed to promote her because she failed to adhere to stereotypical
notions of femininity, a standard which was only applied to female employees. In support of her claim,
Hopkins pointed to a series of comments by her Price Waterhouse superiors which suggested that the
partnership utilized sex-differentiated behavioral standards for evaluating its employees. For example,
Hopkins produced evidence that some of the partners evaluating her candidacy believed her to be too
"macho" and aggressive even though these qualities were rewarded in male candidates. She also
produced evidence that she was criticized for using foul language while the use of foul language was
unremarkable in male employees and noted that a partner praised her by stating that she had "matured
from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but
much more appealing lady [partner] candidate." Id. at 235. Finally, in a piece of evidence the Supreme
Court appeared to deem particularly significant, Hopkins showed that in the meeting in which the
decision not to promote her was explained to her, the partner who relayed the decision advised that she
would increase her chances of being promoted if she would "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. It is
further worth noting that while the decision as a whole was a plurality, the following holdings
commanded a six-justice majority: (1) the sex-stereotypical comments were evidence that Ann Hopkins
was not promoted (in part) because she failed to conform to sex stereotypes; and (2) if Price Waterhouse
failed to promote Hopkins because she failed to conform to sex-stereotypical notions of femininity,
Price Waterhouse discriminated against Hopkins.
"' Id. at 251 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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groups.112 In the case of Price Waterhouse, the "stereotype" associated with
Ann Hopkins's group (women) was femininity (or attributes associated with
femininity). This conclusion is necessarily based on rule-predicate analysis:
Price Waterhouse drew a sex classification (women were treated differently
than men), and the classification was predicated on generalizations about men
and women. Minimally, the gender generalization that underlies a rule that
penalizes a female employee for failing to be feminine is: women are (or
should be) feminine. This gender generalization, the Court seemed to say, is a
"stereotype," and Price Waterhouse was not permitted to impose a sex-
respecting rule on its employees that was predicated on a sex stereotype.1 3
If Brennan's plurality opinion had stopped here, then Price Waterhouse
would have seemed to embrace a perfect proxy definition of "stereotype.""14
After all, the generalization that women are (or should be) feminine is not
obviously spurious." 1 5 Further, in defining this generalization as a "stereotype,"
the Court extended the doctrine's early justice principle because the stereotype
at issue in Price Waterhouse did not result in the categorical exclusion of
women from an opportunity. While women were not permitted to defy the
generalization (as Hopkins had to her peril), women were permitted to adhere
to the generalization and remain employed.
However, Price Waterhouse went on to explain-with Hellerian
flourishll 6-what was especially unfair about Ann Hopkins's employment
situation:
An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and
out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind. 7
From the perspective of defining "stereotype," this catch-22 language
illuminates nothing about the generalization in question ("women are (or
should be) feminine"). Instead, it describes the consequence of applying the
generalization in the particular context that Hopkins faced. If she defied the
generalization, she would be penalized by not being promoted. On the other
hand, if she adhered to the prescription of the generalization, she would be
prevented from displaying characteristics that were necessary to be successful
1
12 Id. at 254.
"' Id. at 250-51.
4 id.
1s Indeed, it may be-in Scalia's framework-statistically sound, although it is unclear what is meant
by women are (or should be) feminine and it is difficult to imagine that it is a generalization that could
be empirically demonstrated.
116 A catch-22 is a situation in which the criteria that must necessarily be met to achieve success are
mutually exclusive; thus success can never be achieved. It is not a situation in which it is difficult to
succeed or in which success is not likely. Joseph Heller coined the term in his novel of the same name.
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).
" Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
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at Price Waterhouse."' 8 In a reading that identifies the catch-22 objection as a
criterion upon which the decision turns, the sex-respecting rule is disallowed
not because it was predicated on a generalization that is spurious or that failed
to provide an avenue for defying the generalization but because the application
of the generalization made it impossible for women to succeed at Price
Waterhouse. 119
In fact, in a catch-22-as-criterion reading of Price Waterhouse, reliance on
the permissibility of the rule's predicate as a "stereotype" seems completely
superfluous. We might just as easily (and more clearly) state the analytic frame
of the decision without making use of the idea of "stereotype": a sex-respecting
rule is discriminatory if it makes it impossible (or significantly harder) for one
sex to succeed in a given context. To carry through with this framing, we might
say that in Ann Hopkins's case, she was treated differently than a male
accountant would have been treated (i.e., she was required to behave in a
manner that is consistent with notions of femininity), and this disparate
treatment was unjust in that she was not permitted to receive the same reward
(promotion) that a male accountant would have received had he behaved in the
same manner.
Thus, in a catch-22 reading, it is immaterial that Hopkins was asked to
conform to traditional notions of femininity. Price Waterhouse might just as
well have asked Hopkins (and all its female employees) to wear a clown
costume in an atmosphere in which clown-wear is less rewarded than non-
clown-wear. In this iteration, the unfairness of Hopkins's situation issues from
the coupling of a mandatory requirement-regardless of the origin or social
significance of the content of that requirement-with a system of reward that is
incommensurate with the system enjoyed by those who do not face the same
requirement. Thus, in this reading, it does not matter whether Price
Waterhouse's sex-respecting rule had anything to do with "stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes.,120
1. Price Waterhouse l and II
In this light we begin to see two Price Waterhouse precedents. A first
reading of Price Waterhouse takes the catch-22 language as a criterion for
finding a rule requiring women to behave femininely to be predicated on a
"stereotype" (i.e., the rule must create a double-bind to be a "stereotype"). This
reading establishes a new method of defining "stereotype" that is animated by a
new justice principle. In this reading, the justice-commitment of the Price
Waterhouse Court holds that it is unfair to apply a nonuniversal gender
u9 Id.
120 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
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generalization where the application of the generalization is disproportionately
burdensome to one sex, regardless of the content of that generalization. The
fact that the Court also identified the rule's predicate ("women are (or should
be) feminine") as a "stereotype" does not seem to mean the same thing that the
designation of "stereotype" has meant in other contexts, in that it does not seem
to mean that the generalization itself is per se impermissible as a rule-predicate.
On the other hand, one could also just as reasonably adopt a second reading
of Price Waterhouse. The second reading of Price Waterhouse finds the
holding consistent with the perfect proxy approach to defining "stereotype."l21
In this reading, the catch-22 language in Price Waterhouse is mere rhetorical
flourish, and the case stands for the proposition that generalizations about male
masculinity and female femininity are "stereotypes" in that they are "fictional,"
"overbroad" or "imperfect proxies," and therefore these generalizations can
never form the predicates of sex-respecting employer or legal rules. 122
However, this second reading also offers a novel justice principle behind
its definition of "stereotype." The "perfect proxy" justice principle requires that
an individual is provided with an opportunity to defy a nonuniversal
generalization that would otherwise exclude her from a category of benefits or
opportunities.123 But the application of generalizations about femininity and
masculinity do not result in the categorical exclusion of men or women.
Instead, masculinity and femininity generalizations allow an opportunity to
conform to the generalization-to assimilate. Thus, individuals are not
penalized for being a man or woman but are instead penalized for failing to
behave as the generalization holds that men or women should behave.
Therefore, in this second reading of Price Waterhouse, the justice principle
animating the definition of "stereotype" is not related to the relative burden that
the generalization places on one sex or to the categorical exclusion of men or
women but is instead grounded in one of two objections: either it is unjust to
require men or women to express a gender identity that is inconsistent with the
identity they would prefer to express, or it is unjust to require women to behave
in a manner that comports with traditional notions of femininity because those
behaviors bear the vestiges of past (or present) subordination.
Unsurprisingly, given the ambiguity with which the Court treated the
significance of the "stereotype" in Price Waterhouse, courts and commentators
have applied the case as though there were two Price Waterhouse precedents.
Price Waterhouse I (PWI) takes seriously the catch-22 criterion and holds that
gender generalizations that allow an avenue of assimilation (including
generalizations about masculinity and femininity) are permissible rule-
predicates as long as the application of the rule does not disproportionately
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burden one sex. 12 4 PWI is most often embraced when generalizations about
masculinity and femininity seem benignly motivated (i.e., not motivated by an
animus towards gender nonconforming individuals and/or homosexuals) and
when the rule-generator (usually an employer) gains a benefit from the
imposition of the rule.125
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently employed a PWI interpretation of
Price Waterhouse in Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co.126 In Jespersen, the
sex-respecting rule at issue was Harrah's "Personal Best" grooming policy that
required female employees to wear makeup and forbade male employees from
doing the same. 12 7 Plaintiff Darlene Jespersen challenged the requirement,
arguing that requiring her to conform to traditional notions of femininity
constituted impermissible sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse.128 In an en
banc decision, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It determined that Harrah's rule did
not place Jespersen in a double-bind because it did not require Jespersen to
appear feminine while rewarding masculine appearance. 29 Taking the catch-22
language to be a criterion for finding a generalization about women and
femininity (i.e., "only women wear makeup" or "women but not men should
wear makeup") to be a "stereotype," the Jespersen court determined that
Harrah's rule did not prevent women from succeeding at Harrah's; it simply
required that women comply with a distinct set of grooming rules. 130 Jespersen
provides a good example of the circumstances in which courts and
commentators seem inclined to apply PWI: the sex-respecting rule seemed
connected to Harrah's desire to attract customers rather than a desire to punish
or harass employees who are gender-nonconforming.131
124 Cf Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e have long
recognized that companies may differentiate between men and women in appearance and grooming
policies .... The material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, but
whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an 'unequal burden' for the plaintiff's gender.").
125 Id.
1 26 Idr
127 Id. at 1107.
128 Id. at 1108.
' Id. at 1113 ("Jespersen's claim here materially differs from Hopkins' claim in Price Waterhouse
because Harrah's grooming standards do not require Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical image that
would objectively impede her ability to perform her job requirements as a bartender.") The court also
engaged in a disparate treatment analysis and determined that the Personal Best policy did not
disproportionately burden female employees as compared to male employees. Id. at 1111-13.
1o The court did state that if the grooming requirement indicated a "sexually stereotypical intent" on the
part of Harrah's, then the requirement might constitute sex stereotyping. Id. at 1112. In support of this
assertion, the court referred favorably to EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
In Sage, a female lobby attendant was required to wear a "sexually provocative," revealing uniform; the
court concluded that the requirement constituted sex stereotyping. The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to
explain why a requirement directed at sexualizing or sexually objectifying an employee constitutes
"stereotyping" while a requirement directed at feminizing an employee does not.
13 Harrah's rule had the effect of punishing Darlene Jespersen, but the record did not provide
information regarding Jespersen's sexual orientation. See Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination:
Darlene Jespersen's Fight Against the Barbie-fication ofBartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
285 (2007) (describing the author's representation of Jespersen as Senior Counsel at Lambda Legal
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Price Waterhouse II (PWII), on the other hand, adopts the perfect proxy
definition of "stereotype" in the context of generalizations about masculinity
and femininity and thereby embraces the second of the two justice principles
discussed above. Where PWII is embraced, the court or commentator's
attention is focused on the nonuniversality of the sex-respecting rule's predicate
(e.g., not all women are feminine, nor all men masculine), and the sex-
respecting rule is disallowed.132 PWII is most often applied when three factors
are present: (1) the court or commentator perceives there to be less of a viable
road of assimilation available to the regulated individual (often because the
plaintiff is perceived to actually "be" non-feminine or non-masculine rather
than simply "behaving" non-femininely or non-masculinely); (2) the rule-
generator (again, usually an employer) does not seem to gain a generalized
benefit (such as attracting customers) from the rule; and (3) the sex-respecting
rule seems motivated by animus directed at either gender non-conforming
individuals or at individuals perceived to be transsexual or homosexual.
For example, in Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit adopted a
perfect proxy PWII approach to the question of whether a male-to-female
transsexual employee could be penalized for failing to behave and appear "like
a man." The court held that to require a male employee to behave and appear
like a man-that is, masculinely-was to require the employee to comport with
a stereotype.' 34 Similarly, the idea that a male employee's appearance or
behavior must accord with notions of masculinity was also identified as
impermissible stereotyping under a PWII approach by the Ninth Circuit in Rene
v. MGM Grand Hotel.135 In Rene, the plaintiff was a gay man who complained
that his coworkers harassed and demeaned him by treating him like a woman
because he did not, in his coworkers' view, adequately behave like a man. The
court found that "[t]he repeated testimony that his co-workers treated Rene, in a
variety of ways, 'like a woman' constitute[d] ample evidence of gender
stereotyping" 136 in Rene, but four years later the same court nonetheless
concluded that Darlene Jespersen was not the victim of sex stereotyping,
despite the fact that the gender generalization forming the penalizing rule's
predicate was the same in both instances: "men must behave and appear like
men or masculinely, and women must behave and appear like women or
femininely."
However, the discovery of a "stereotype" in the PWII cases (or perhaps
more accurately, the decision to apply PWII rather than PWI in the first place)
appears to turn on an assessment not of the universality or spuriousness of the
Defense); see also Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 467 (2007).
132 C.f Doe v. Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580-81 (7th Cir. 1997).
"' 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
'4 Id. at 572.
"' 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
36 Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, J., concurring).
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gender generalization that forms the rule's predicate but instead on an
assessment of the three factors mentioned above: (1) the consequence of
applying the generalization-where the court or commentator perceives the
plaintiff to somehow "be" non-feminine or non-masculine, the consequence of
the rule begins to look more like categorical exclusion, as the plaintiff seems
either less able to assimilate or asking plaintiff to assimilate seems somehow
less just; (2) the degree to which the employer receives a general benefit from
the rule (e.g., Harrah's rule attracts a customer demographic, while MGM
Grand's and the City of Salem's rules do not); and (3) the appropriateness of
the purpose of the rule (e.g., Harrah's desire to attract customers is appropriate,
while MGM Grand's and the City of Salem's desire to penalize gender-non-
conformers/transsexuals/homosexuals is not appropriate). If these three criteria
are satisfied, PWII is usually employed, and the generalization that "men are
masculine" is recognized as a "stereotype" even though it is not recognized as a
"stereotype" in other contexts.
2. Truths and Proxies, Assimilation and Exclusion
The addition of these two Price Waterhouse definitions of "stereotype" in
the context of assimilation cases has led sex-stereotyping doctrine to splinter
along several analytic axes. Where application of a sex-respecting rule in
question categorically excludes men or women from a class of benefits or
opportunities, courts and commentators apply either a "false generalizations" or
"perfect proxy" definition of "stereotype." Similarly, where the sex-respecting
rule does not result in categorical exclusion but instead requires assimilation to
a gendered norm, courts and commentators employ either a PWI or a PWII
definition of "stereotype." 37
This bifurcated analysis has produced a doctrine with a set of internally
inconsistent de facto rules for assessing gender generalizations that form the
predicates of sex-respecting rules. Generally, a sex-respecting legal or
employer rule is disallowed when it fails to permit an avenue of assimilation,
even when the state or employer rationally assumes that assimilation is
improbable or that it will be difficult or costly (as was the case in VMJ) but
excluding instances in which assimilation is genuinely impossible (as in the
case of a bona fide occupational qualification). '3 So if the rule does not
provide an avenue of assimilation, the generalization that forms the rule's
predicate must represent a perfect proxy. The second prong of this bifurcated
137 The state or employer permits an avenue for gender assimilation when it allows candidates to try to
meet sex-specific standards. The state or employer does not have to alter the standard to alleviate the
need for assimilation.
38 See Case, supra note II, at 1451. For an interesting discussion of BFOQ, see Russell K. Robinson,
Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CAL. L. REV. I
(2007).
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analysis provides that in instances in which assimilation is permitted, the
gender generalization need not provide a perfect proxy as long as assimilating
to the sex-specific standard does not disproportionately burden one sex (as with
Hopkins), unless the assimilationist demands are motivated primarily by a
desire to penalize gender non-conforming individuals or individuals who are
perceived to be homosexual.
So in defining "stereotype," courts and commentators split into a few
justice-based camps: some hold the "sex stereotype" rhetorical line at spurious
generalizations, while others embrace Case's "perfect proxy," and still others
adopt a bifurcated approach that holds nonuniversal generalizations to be just in
assimilation contexts but unjust in exclusionary contexts. In this light, it
becomes apparent that the heuristic of "stereotype" is analytically unhelpful. Is
a generalization only a stereotype if it is never or only rarely true? Must a
generalization be accurate as applied in every case to avoid being characterized
as a stereotype? Is a generalization a stereotype if it imposes an extra burden on
outliers by demanding uniformity in an aspect of behavior that should be
committed to autonomous choice? Our definition of "stereotype" in these
contexts turns on the conception of justice we embrace, and in this way the
term "stereotype" only parrots back the justice principle we impose upon it.
Our concept of "stereotype" is simply too thin to do more.
However, there is a key point to distill from these otherwise disparate
"stereotype" analyses. The point of embarkation for each analysis is the
(posited) fact of gendered regularities of behavior. The factual predicate of each
contested rule holds that men and women generally behave in predictable ways:
men usually do not wear dresses (City of Salem); 139 women usually do not
flourish in an adversarial environment (VMI); 140 women attend more often to
domestic affairs than men do (Laffey); 141 and so forth. The stereotype heuristic
has addressed these putative regularities as if courts and commentators were
concerned about whether they exist, when in fact the concern driving the
analyses was why they exist. Courts and commentators were disquieted not by
the nonuniversality of these generalizations but by the implicit concern that the
regularities were guided by background social rules that were themselves
potentially unjustified. Given this concern, antidiscrimination law and theory
were committed to not allowing legal or employer rules to further entrench,
instantiate, or enforce these background social rules.
While the conceptual and doctrinal morass created by divergent methods
for defining "stereotype" might tempt us to abandon the project of rule-
predicate analysis altogether, this temptation should be resisted. There is a
reason why antidiscrimination analysis was initially concerned with sex-
"9 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
140 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
141 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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respecting rule-predicates. In criticizing the "antiquated" and "false"
generalizations about men and women that served to justify sex-classifications,
courts were striking at rule-predicates that embodied not just spurious
predicates but also those that represented the set of background informal rules
that produced the sex-segregatory society that antidiscrimination law and
theory were committed to-if not remedying-at least not reinforcing. 142
Towards this end, courts and commentators attempted to draw a line
between gender generalizations that operated not only as descriptive
generalizations (e.g., "women are shorter than men"), but also as prescriptive
generalizations (e.g., "women are primarily responsible for domestic affairs")
and other rule sets (e.g., an employer rule that disallows the hiring of married
women but not married men).143 Although this concern has been muddled
within the "stereotype" heuristic, the impetus to disaggregate our legal and
employment rules from underlying social gender prescriptions is rooted in
doubts about the sufficiency of the reasons for and justifications of underlying
gender prescriptions (e.g., why should women have a special relationship to
domesticity?) and the sense that, in light of these doubts, legal and employer
rules must not play a role in entrenching or enforcing those regularities of
behavior. 144 In other words, under the banner of prohibiting the enforcement of
"stereotypes," antidiscrimination law has consistently been committed to
protecting the revisability of gender generalizations.
In sum, gender generalizations are subject to special antidiscrimination law
scrutiny, and, as we have seen, the explanation for that scrutiny cannot rest on
the fact that gender generalizations are more "spurious," "false," or "over
broad" than other kinds of generalizations. Although we generally tolerate legal
and employer rule-predicates that are reasonably accurate and thereby serve as
reasonably good predictors of future behavior, gender generalizations are
frequently disallowed as rule-predicates even in instances in which they appear
142 Consider, for example, the picture of pre-Civil Rights Act sex segregation offered by Kimberly
Yuracko:
Indeed, private discrimination was in some cases required by state law. By the mid-1960s 26
states prohibited women from working in certain jobs and 19 states had hours regulations for
women workers. Women were statutorily excluded from jobs that required heavy lifting as
well as from work as diverse as tending bar, shining shoes, and legislative service. Society
viewed men as the primary labor market participants and wage earners. Society viewed
women as peripheral market participants and supplemental wage earners seeking "pin
money."
Kimberly Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83
TEX. L. REV. 167 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
143 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
'" These doubts in turn give rise to doubts about the descriptive generalizations that follow from the
behavioral regularity that is created by the prescriptive force of the regulatory rule (e.g., statistically,
women spend more time performing domestic tasks than men). When this potentially accurate
descriptive generalization forms the factual predicate of an employer rule (e.g., men but not women
receive housekeeping assistance), the concern is not that it is descriptively inaccurate or spurious but
that the reason or justification for the underlying prescriptive rule which creates the regularity is
inadequate to support a sex-based classification in a legal or employer rule, and therefore the proposition
ought not be enforced or entrenched by legal or employer rules.
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to be statistically accurate. Accuracy does not necessarily render gender
generalizations suitable rule-predicates because the descriptive accuracy of
gender generalizations is often the result of prescriptive forces that are
themselves suspect from the perspective of antidiscrimination law and theory.
It is unease with the underlying prescriptive dimensions of gender
generalizations, as well as the relationship between those prescriptive
dimensions and legal or employer rules, that lies at the heart of the "stereotype"
heuristic.
Therefore, Parts II and III of this Article will consider this relationship
between the prescriptive dimensions of gender generalizations and their role as
rule-predicates. Part II will explore the prescriptive dimensions of gender
generalizations. Part III will then discuss the ways in which the prescriptive
dimensions of gender generalizations problematically interact with legal and
employer rules, using the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jespersen as an example.
II. GENDER GENERALIZATIONS AS GENDER RULES
The generalization "men do not usually wear dresses" describes (with
imperfect accuracy) a state of the world, but it also does a great deal more than
that. Gender generalizations are something more than imperfect descriptive
proxies (as all rule-predicates are) because they guide as well as describe our
practices. In addition to simply communicating propositions that identify a state
of the world, gender generalizations precede, create, and constitute that which
they describe. Thus, in neglecting to account for the prescriptive dimensions of
gender generalizations, conventional sex-respecting rule analysis fails to
articulate what is unique about the objection it would (albeit inconsistently)
enforce. 145 The key to the uniqueness question-that is, what is "special" about
gender generalizations as opposed to other varieties of nonuniversal
generalizations-lies in understanding the phenomenon of gender rules.
However, to understand the distinct phenomenon of gender rules, it is
helpful to take a step back and first understand a little bit about the nature of
generalizations and the structure of rules. As the ideas advanced here build
upon Frederick Schauer's philosophical account of both generalizations and
rules, a brief summary of those accounts follows.
14 C.f SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 153-54 ("[T]he major lesson for us is that the
condemnation of gender-based generalizations is not simply an instantiation of a condemnation of
generalizations, but is an outgrowth of something distinctive about the treatment of gender .... The fact
that we routinely condemn even statistically rational sex discrimination ... shows that the issue is not
generalization but gender.").
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A. The Power ofPrescriptive Generalizations
To begin a discussion of prescriptive gender generalizations, it is important
to remember that not every gender generalization has attendant prescriptive
dimensions. There is a narrow subset of gender generalizations that can be
described as purely descriptive. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to return to
the oft-quoted taxonomy of gender generalizations offered by the Manhart
Court.146 In Manhart, the Court described a dichotomy of "true" and "not true"
or "fictional" differences between men and women. 147 The Court used the
examples of "men are taller" versus "women are worse drivers" to illustrate its
point that some gender generalizations are not stereotypes, while others are
stereotypes.148
What courts like the Manhart Court have struggled to isolate with this
"real" and "fictional" distinction is the broad class of gender generalizations
that have attendant prescriptive dimensions from the narrower category of
purely descriptive gender generalizations. When courts identify a so-called
"real difference" generalization, they are in fact isolating what they believe to
be a purely descriptive generalization. 149 A purely descriptive generalization
describes a regularity of events or behavior but lacks prescriptive force, such as
the generalization "it rains more in Mobile than in Birmingham."' 50 It is
accurate to say that it rains more in Mobile than in Birmingham, but the fact
that it rains more in Mobile now does not influence whether it is likely to rain
more in Mobile in the future. The rain, in essence, is indifferent to the
proposition "it rains more in Mobile than in Birmingham" and is incapable of
molding its behavior to accord with the generalization. Nor does the
generalization "it rains more in Mobile than in Birmingham" articulate or affect
what we mean by "more" or "rain" or "Mobile" in other contexts. A purely
descriptive generalization about rain in Mobile lacks the capacity to redefine
the past, construct the present, or project into the future-in other words, it
lacks prescriptive force.151
146 City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). Although Manhart is often quoted in the
context of sex-stereotyping analysis, the Manhart Court itself did not engage in sex-stereotyping
analysis because the Court was confronted with a rule-predicate gender generalization that it believed
articulated a "real" difference between men and women: "women live longer than men." Id.
47 Id.
148 id.
"4 Schauer uses the phrase "descriptive rule" to describe purely descriptive generalizations, which he
takes to be generalizations that are entrenched in the manner described infra at Section IlI.B. but that
lack prescriptive character. In contrast, Schauer describes prescriptive rules as "mandatory rules."
Nothing follows from the application of term "rule" here, so in the interest of simplicity I use the term
"generalization." SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 1-4.
15 Id.
' When the Court identifies what it understands to be a purely descriptive generalization as the
gendered predicate of a sex-respecting rule, it does not engage in "stereotyping" analysis, as the
stereotype heuristic captures judgments about the justness of applying gender generalizations with
prescriptive dimensions. Instead, in the Equal Protection context, the Court will interrogate the causal
relationship between the imperative and the purpose of the rule to ensure that the sex-respecting
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In contrast, prescriptive generalizations guide behavior in three ways. First,
certain types of prescriptive generalizations-known as constitutive rules-tell
us what types of behavior "count" in a given context.1 52 For example, the
generalization "pitches in the strike zone are strikes" tells us which pitches
count as "strikes" and which do not. Second, the same generalization can also
serve as a regulatory prescription, applying pressure directly to our actions. If I
am a pitcher and I wish to do something that counts as a strike, I am going to
try to pitch into the strike zone because of the rule about pitches and strikes.
Further, the generalization can affect behavior in a third way, in that the
rule about strikes exerts pressure on our understanding of "strikes" beyond
setting a specific navigational goal. Because the rule says nothing about the
color of the ball, the speed of the pitch, or the ethnicity of the pitcher, we do not
think that color, speed, or ethnicity are criterial with respect to strikes."5 3 The
generalization suppresses these properties as irrelevant to the category it
defines (strikes). 154 These now irrelevant properties fade from the forefront of
our understanding of strikes, and the possibility of incorporating color, speed,
or ethnicity into the set of properties that we hold to be material to "strikes"
becomes more remote. 155
classification is being employed to achieve a justified end, rather than as a pretext for excluding women
or men. In other words, the Court will ask whether the purpose of the rule constitutes "an important
government interest" and whether the means (the imperative) is "substantially related" to the purpose of
the rule. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Examples of these purely descriptive generalizations
have included: "women live longer than men," City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704
(1978), and "a biological mother is necessarily present at the birth of her child, while a biological father
is not necessarily present at the birth of his child," Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 444 (1998).
When confronting what it believes to be a purely descriptive generalization in the context of Title
VII, the Court engages in a similar interrogation of the causal relationship between the rule's imperative
and its purpose, using the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) standard. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977). In applying the BFOQ standard, the Court determines whether the purpose of the
rule is justified in that it relates to the "essence" of the employer's business and that the imperative is the
least restrictive means of achieving that end. Purely descriptive generalizations that have served as
factual predicates in this context include: "only women can become pregnant" (Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)) and "women are shorter and lighter than men" (Dothard,
433 U.S. 321 (1977)).
It is important to note that a generalization that is purely descriptive is not necessarily a "perfect
proxy" (i.e., universal). A generalization may fail to obtain in every case, as with "women are shorter
than men," but still be probabilistically or statistically sound. However, if a rule's justified purpose can
be achieved by means other than a sex-respecting imperative, the Court will require the rule's imperative
to exclude sex classification and to instead employ an imperative that applies directly to the desired
quality.
152 Constitutive rules are discussed in greater detail infra in Section III.C.
1 See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 21-22.
1 Id. ("In focusing on a limited number of properties, a generalization simultaneously suppresses
others, including those marking real differences among the particulars treated as similar by the selected
properties.")
15 The effect of the suppression and emphasis of properties on our understanding of future possibilities
is, at least in part, a psychological phenomenon. See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 43
("Entrenchment makes the properties suppressed by a generalization less subject to recall on demand,
and entrenched generalizations mould our imagination and apprehension in such a way that methods of
thinking that would focus on different properties become comparatively less accessible"). The
quintessential example of this "molding" arises in the context of language. Cognitive psychologists have
observed how rules of language can influence the degree to which speakers of those languages observe
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On the other hand, the strike zone generalization emphasizes the physical
placement of pitches, which renders this quality prominent in our
understanding of strikes. In the future we will pay particular attention to the
placement of pitches, which may be fine if our original generalization was
correct in identifying what is relevant about strikes in light of our purpose in
defining strikes in the first place. But what happens when our generalization
gets this initial sorting wrong? Or, more accurately, what happens when our
information or beliefs about which properties are relevant to the category
change over time?
Schauer paints the role of generalizations in our decision-making lives in
grand-but ultimately compelling-proportions. 156 "To generalize," states
Schauer, "is to engage in a process that is part of life itself."' Without the
ability to generalize we would lack the capacity to organize information in a
way that permits us to discern patterns and draw meaning from particular
attributes or events.1 58 Generalizations help us organize complex and changing
information into a format that is useful for making predictions about future
events. Without the ability to generalize, we would be hobbled in our attempts
to learn from the past, to plan for the future, and to make sense of the
present. 159
But the benefits of generalizing come at a cost. Generalizing propositions
such as "men do not usually wear dresses," even if statistically sound,
necessarily produce errors.' 60 If I am speaking to a colleague and I use the
foregoing proposition, I will be in error insofar as my colleague takes me to
mean that no man usually wears a dress.161 My colleague may point to
particular examples of men who do usually wear dresses. In this instance, the
plasticity of conversation will allow me to refine my proposition to better
account for what Schauer describes as "recalcitrant experience": evidence that
the generalization is flawed in a way that matters given the purpose of using the
generalization. 62 Recalcitrant experience may show us that a generalization is
over-inclusive or under-inclusive in light of the reason that we are applying the
generalization; or it may reveal that a generalization thought to be universal is
not universal by demonstrating that it fails to obtain in a particular case; or it
or perceive certain properties. For a fascinating account of this phenomenon, see Lera Boroditsky, How
Does our Language Shape the Way We Think?, in WHAT'S NEXT: DISPATCHES ON THE FUTURE OF
SCIENCE 116 (Max Brockman ed., 2009).
156 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 18-23.
" Id. at 18.
18id.
' SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 7-19.
160 SCHAUER, RULES supra note 1, at 31-37.
161 Id.
'6' Id. at 39 (identifying three varieties of recalcitrant experience, "the first in which a probabilistically
warranted generalization is incorrect on this occasion, the second in which a supposedly universal




may show that the generalization suppresses qualities that are relevant to the
conclusion drawn.163 Here, the discovery of a man who does wear dresses is a
kind of recalcitrant experience.1 Yet when presented with this information, I
can respond to it. Whether I wrongly believed that my statement was universal
or it was wrongly taken to be universal, the plasticity of conversation will
permit me to alter my generalization to more accurately reflect what I now
know to be true about the world.165
The gender generalizations that form the predicates of sex-respecting rules,
however, are not subject to this flexible "conversational model" of
generalization-formation.1 66 Instead, they exist within what Schauer describes
as an "entrenchment model" of generalizations. The concepts contained
within the generalizations that form the factual predicates of sex-respecting
rules have become "entrenched" in that they are sufficiently accepted by the
relevant communityl68 as guides for organizing information about the subject
of the generalizations (here, men and women) such that they need not be
asserted and endorsed conversationally to be identified or understood.169
Instead, they are simply recognized by the relevant community as a method of
organizing information about men and women.170 In other words, "men do not
usually wear dresses" is a generally accepted guide for organizing information
about men and dresses, regardless of whether any one individual believes the
generalization to be true, justified, or applicable in any given situation.
Because they are not asserted conversationally, entrenched generalizations
cannot "explain away" misunderstandings or misapplications with
supplemental information, the way that I can explain to my colleague that I did
not mean that no one man usually wears a dress, but instead I meant that most
men do not usually wear dresses.' 7' Similarly, entrenched generalizations
cannot be as sensitive to recalcitrant experience as non-entrenched
generalizations.172 When a non-entrenched generalization meets with
recalcitrant experience, the conceptual contours of the generalization bend to
account for the new information, and the new experience is accommodated.173




161 Id. at 38-42.
'
66 Id. at 39.
161 Id. at 42-52.
'68 Here, the "relevant community" is the community affected by the sex-respecting rules that courts
evaluate.
169 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 42-52.
1o0Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 47.
1'
7 Id. at 42.
174 Id. at 39.
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an entrenched generalization meets with recalcitrant experience, the
generalization resists amendment.' 75
Moreover, while all generalizations suffer from the kinds of flaws that are
revealed by recalcitrant experience, these flaws are ossified when the
generalization is treated as entrenched by a broad community of people, as is
the case with social rules. When a community behaves as though the
generalization were entrenched, the fact that the generalization is treated as
entrenched becomes a reason to treat the generalization as entrenched. 1 In
this way, because the practice of treating an entrenched generalization as
entrenched becomes self-sustaining, the generalizations begin to operate with
prescriptive force.177
In fact, when a particular community treats a generalization as sufficiently
entrenched, the generalization begins to function as a type of social "rule"-
that is, it begins to provide an independent reason for acting in conformity with
the generalization. At this stage, the degree to which the generalization
serves a useful purpose (and serves that purpose well) becomes less significant
than the fact that the relevant community accepts the generalization as
entrenched. The relevant community treats the generalization as entrenched
even in instances in which using the generalization to achieve a particular
purpose seems to produce an incorrect result.
Thus, when an entrenched generalization operates as a social rule, the
flaws of the entrenched generalization (e.g., its over-inclusiveness, under-
inclusiveness, or emphasis of irrelevant qualities) become ossified. When new
information calls into question the causal link between the scope of the
generalization and the purpose of generalizing in the first place, the fact that the
generalization is entrenched serves as an impediment to revising it. Similarly,
when new information calls into question our purpose in generalizing in the
first place (e.g., enforcing status or hierarchy), we continue to behave as though
the generalization were justified (i.e., we behave as though the generalization is
justified in light of the conclusion drawn or as though our purpose in
generalizing itself is justified) even though we now have reason to believe that
it is not.
The argument presented here holds that gender generalizations in particular
exert this type of revision-resistant prescriptive force. Although our information
and beliefs about men and women have changed dramatically over the last
several decades, the gender generalizations that form the factual predicates of
our sex-respecting rules resist revision, even where (as is often the case) the
1' As discussed infra in Part Ill, this is not to say that entrenched generalizations are unaffected by
recalcitrant experience but merely that the process by which entrenched generalizations adapt to
changing information is less immediate.
76 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 47-48.
'" Id. at 49-52.
17s id.
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purpose of generalizing along gender lines (e.g., to reinforce status or
hierarchy) is no longer justified in light of our present beliefs. In other words,
the argument here holds that gender generalizations are best understood as a
distinct type of social rule: one that typically advances a socially disavowed
-- 179purpose and is resistant to revision.
Further, it is these three factors-(1) that gender generalizations are
prescriptive; (2) that the purpose of generalizing along gender lines is often
inconsistent with our publicly-held present beliefs (which thereby produces
unjust outcomes); and (3) that gender generalizations resist revision-that both
explain and justify courts' commitment to disallowing gender generalizations
as the factual predicate of sex-respecting rules. Each of these factors is
considered in more detail below.
B. Gender Generalizations as Social Rules
To explore the idea that gender generalizations function as a distinct
species of social rule, let us return to the example of the generalization "men do
not usually wear dresses." If we understand this proposition to have
prescriptive force, what manner of rule is it? It is not a formal rule-it is not,
for example, a rule that has a formulation that is mediated by an authoritative
source. Nor is it a rule that is enforced by legal or other organized and explicit
sanction. How, then, do we know that it is a rule?
Part of the answer lies in understanding that there are two kinds of rules
that give rise to rule-guided behavior: formulated rules (which can be either
authoritative or unauthoritative) and unformulated rules (which are usually
unauthoritative).180 A formulated rule can be reduced to a generally accepted
proposition or set of propositions,s such as the Rule Against Perpetuities,182
or the Golden Rule,183 or the rule in baseball that the batter must stand within
the batter's box during his time at bat.184 Some formulated rules are mediated
79 In identifying gender rules as a distinct species of rule, I do not mean to suggest that gender rules are
not social rules. Instead, I take gender rules to be a distinct type of social rule.
1o See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 62-72. Schauer takes as "unassailable" certain propositions
that support the idea that rules need not be authoritatively formulated. He offers several examples in
support of this conclusion, including the fact that we can use a number of different propositions to
formulate the same rule, rules remain the same when translated into different languages, and so forth.
Schauer understands the distinction between formulated and unformulated rules to be significant in that
he understands unformulated or unformulatable rules to provide a weaker entrenchment of the rule's
generalizations, a point with which this argument is in accord.
... Id. at 62.
182 A commonly accepted formulation of the rule is: "To be valid, an interest must vest or fail within 21
years of a life in being." See J. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 201 (4th ed. 1942).
183 Although many versions of the Golden Rule (also known as the ethic of reciprocity) are found in
different philosophies and religions, many believe Sextus the Pythagroean first articulated the Golden
Rule in 406 B.C. as, "what you wish your neighbors to be to you, such be also to them." Other
formulations include: "do unto others as you would have others do unto you."
' See Rule 2.00 of the Official Rules of Major League Baseball, which states, "the batter's box is the
area within which the batter shall stand during his time at bat."
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by an authority that arbitrates disputes about when and how to apply the rules
(such as a court in the case of the Rule Against Perpetuities or the Major
League Baseball Commission in the case of baseball). Other formulated rules
are not mediated by such authorities. For example, no one institution or person
is authorized to determine when or how the Golden Rule has been violated.185
Importantly, the existence of both formulated and unformulated rules is
evidenced by a convergence of behavior: for a rule to exist, people must behave
in a manner that is consistent with the existence of that rule.186 However,
formulated rules have an obvious advantage in this capacity: their very
formulation provides evidence, although not conclusive evidence, that a rule
exists.
Unformulated rules, on the other hand, must be evidenced entirely by our
practices. As Schauer observes, "insofar as some number of people have
internalized the same rule, a rule with the same meaning, and have treated that
meaning as entrenched, the rule can be said to exist, for those people, even
without a canonical formulation." 18 8 Minimally, then, an unformulated rule is
evidenced by a convergence of behavior that indicates that a rule exists.189
Therefore, to demonstrate that a gender rule exists, we must demonstrate that
the relevant community behaves as though a rule exists.
In exploring this idea, let us consider an application of the generalization
we have been discussing: men do not usually wear dresses. Consider the iconic
train platform scene in the 1959 film Some Like It Hot. In the scene, Jack
Lemmon wears a dress and heels and wobbles down a train platform to
comedic effect.190 The joke in the film relies upon a non-obvious understanding
of the following proposition: men do not wear dresses.' 9'
But the film does not instruct the audience that men do not wear dresses.
The audience enters the theatre already versed-trained, even-in whatever
knowledge is required to get the joke. 192 The audience demonstrates its
knowledge by grasping the joke, but the audience has not necessarily
185 Thus, because the Golden Rule lacks an authoritative source or authority charged with mediating
disputes, we would have to develop exogenous criteria for mediating disputes in application.
86 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 62-72.
187 Thus, for example, if Rule 2.00 of the Official Rules of Major League Baseball remained on the
books but players ceased to observe it and could do so without sanction, it would no longer be accurate
to describe it as a rule.
188 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 71.
189 It bears emphasizing that a convergence of behavior is a minimal requirement for the existence of a
rule. It is a necessary but not sufficient existence condition.
'" SOME LIKE IT HOT (United Artists 1959).
191 The proposition might just as easily be: men do not usually wear dresses. These formulations are used
interchangeably through this piece. See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 71; supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
192 For a philosophical discussion of the criteria that must be met for one to grasp a joke, see TED
COHEN, JOKES (1999).
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demonstrated knowledge of a particular proposition.193 After all, the audience
does not have to believe the proposition to be true to get the joke nor does the
proposition need to be true (indeed, it is not true in the film).194 Thus, to grasp
the joke it is not sufficient to know a fact about the world (i.e., that men do not
usually wear dresses) because a fact about the world, even if true (and/or
understood probabilistically), does not explain what is funny about this instance
in which a man does wear a dress.195
Similarly, the audience's understanding of the joke is not dependant upon a
particular normative belief about the relationship between men and dresses. To
understand the joke, the audience need not believe that Jack Lemmon should
refrain from wearing a dress. Instead, the audience demonstrates the ability to
apply the generalization in a way that makes sense of the scene.196 The ability
the audience demonstrates is much more sophisticated than a mere
understanding of the proposition that underlies it.197 In laughing at Lack
Lemmon, the audience demonstrates that it knows the rules of a particular
gender game and that it has mastered the technique of applying them. 198
So, recalling that unformulated rules are evidenced by our practices and,
specifically, by the convergences or regularities in our behavior that are formed
by the observation of a shared social rule, consider the train platform scene in
the following light. In communicating his joke through the visual depiction of
Lemmon in a dress, the filmmaker relies on two convergences of behavior: (1)
the convergence of behavior that is reflected in the proposition that men do not
193 For a treatment of the difference between having propositional knowledge as opposed to knowledge
of how to do something (so-called "knowledge how," which is the kind of knowledge at issue here), see
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
194 It is unclear what "true" means in this context, but it may mean that the proposition expresses a
statistically sound generalization. See SCHAUER, PROFILES, supra note 4, at 1-25.
195 See COHEN, supra note 192. What is funny about the scene is something more than the depiction of
the unusual; something must bridge the fact that what we see is unusual to the conclusion that it is
funny. Even knowing a fact about the world (that men do not usually wear dresses) does not tell the
audience how to apply that fact here, to Jack Lemmon on the train platform.
196 It is important to be clear that the ability to "correctly" use a rule is a different ability than the ability
to explain the correct use of a rule. We may be able to apply gender rules without knowing how we
know how to apply them and without being able to explain the criteria for their correct application. See
G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING 41 (2d ed. 2005)
(observing, in the context of the correct application of the rules of English, that "[t]hough correct use
and correct explanation are . . .connected, they do not entail one another").
197 As discussed in more detail supra in Part II, the description offered here suggests that the audience
has mastered the constitutive rules of the particular gender game portrayed in the film. Constitutive rules
are rules that constitute social practices and thereby permit us to determine when and whether we are
engaging in the practice as well as enable us to make "moves" that have significance within the practice.
See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 33 (1969) (stating that when a rule is constitutive, "behavior which
is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if the
rule or rules did not exist"). Here, the significance of the act of wearing a dress is constituted by the
rules of the gender game being played. Because both the filmmaker and the audience are versed in the
rules of the game, the filmmaker is able to make a "move" that has gendered significance (in this case,
humor) the same way that the rules of chess permit a chess-player to make a move that signifies
checkmate.
198 For an interesting, if controversial, discussion of what it means to master the application of
constitutive rules, see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR (1974).
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usually wear dresses (meaning the social fact that men tend not to wear
dresses); and (2) the convergence of behavior that is reflected in the audience's
laughter (manifesting, as it does, some kind of shared understanding of a
relationship between men and dresses).
Each of these convergences of behavior suggests that a distinct species of
unformulated social rule is at work. The first convergence of behavior
corresponds to a regularity in the world-men indeed do not generally wear
dresses-which suggests that a regulatory rule may be constructing this
phenomenon.19 9 The second convergence of behavior-our shared ability to
apply the generalization "men do not wear dresses" in a way that permits us to
conclude that men who do wear dresses are engaging in behavior that we might
describe as gender transgression or nonconformity-suggests that a constitutive
rule is at work. 200 An examination of how gender generalizations function as
both regulatory and constitutive social rules follows below.
1. Gender Rules as Regulatory Rules
201When people follow rules, behavior becomes regularized2. Individuals
acting in conformity with a rule behave in predictable ways that we can
accurately describe in generalities.202 For example, observation of a rule that
class begins at eight o'clock produces a behavioral uniformity: a classroom full
of people waiting in their seats at eight o'clock. It may be the case that some
members of the class are not early risers and would prefer to arrive later in the
day, but the prescriptive pressure of the rule generally overrides these
individual preferences. 20 3 As a result of the rule we have a regularity of
behavior that we can describe as a generalization: students are in their seats by
eight o'clock. The generalization may not be universally true (inevitably, there
are stragglers), but it is also not spurious. If it were the case that students were
not generally in their seats at eight o'clock, we would probably conclude there
was no such rule (or that the rule was not generally observed or obeyed).204
Similarly, gendered regularities of behavior can be understood as the
product of rule-guided behavior. As discussed above, gender generalizations
that have historically been heuristically described as "stereotypes" (e.g.,
"women have a special relationship with domesticity," "men are more suited to
be estate administrators," and "men do not wear dresses") are propositions that
describe regularities of behavior with varying degrees of accuracy, ranging
from spuriousness to near universality. These behavioral regularities can be
' ScHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 6.
200 Id. at 6-7.





said to be the product of rule-following to the extent that they are not produced
coincidentally by the individual application of reasons to the situation at hand
(i.e., each man who does not wear a dress does so for reasons unrelated to the
fact that other men do not wear dresses). 205 For behavior to be described as
rule-guided, individuals who behave in conformity with the rule must do so
because of the rule, not simply because the strictures of the rule coincide with
the individuals' own reasons for acting. 206
In other words, as Schauer succinctly restates Joseph Raz, rules are reasons
for action.207 Or, more specifically, rules provide an independent reason for
action.208 Rules apply normative pressure to behavior and that pressure obtains
even in instances in which applying the justification or purpose for the rule
directly to the situation at hand would not yield the same result.209 Thus, the
key to engaging in rule-guided behavior (as opposed to acting out of habit or
for our own independent reasons) is that the normative pressure of following
the rule provides a reason for engaging in behavior that we otherwise would
not. 210
In contrast, outside the context of rule-following, when our reasons for
acting in a particular way do not obtain in a given instance, we generally alter
our behavior to account for the particularities of the situation.211 For example,
assume that I drive a specific way to work each day because it is faster than the
alternative route. However, on a particular day I observe that my usual route is
clogged with traffic due to road construction. In such an instance, I would
ordinarily change my behavior and not drive my usual route because the reason
that I engage in the behavior (because it is faster than the alternative route) no
longer obtains. In such an instance, although I drive my usual route with
regularity, when I do so I am not engaging in rule-following because the
putative "rule" ("drive the same way to work each day") does not apply
normative pressure to my behavior independent of the reason for the rule
(getting to work faster).212 When circumstances are altered such that the reason
for the regularity in behavior no longer applies to the new circumstances, I
205 Alternative explanations are also possible. A second explanation would be that the regularity is
purely the product of non-volitional forces (e.g., intrinsic dimensions of the non-human world or
physiological phenomena beyond an individual non-dress-wearer's control).
206 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 113 (noting that for a rule to exist for a particular individual, it
must provide that individual a reason for acting that does not amount to a "coincidence of behavior.
Following a rule requires being guided by that rule." Therefore, an individual can only be said to be
following a rule when that individual "performs an act because the rule indicates that it is to be
performed."). It is important to be clear, however, that the rule need not provide our sole reason for
acting in conformity with the rule's imperative. We can describe our behavior as rule-guided as long as
the existence of the rule is among the reasons we behave in conformity with it. Id.
207 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 4; JOSEPH RAZ, supra note 1, at 51. See also HART, supra note 2;
H.L.A. HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1953).
208 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 112-18.
209id
21I0 id.
211 Id. at 51.
212 Id. at 64, 113.
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apply the reason for my action directly to the situation and abandon my
regularity (by taking the alternative route to work). Therefore, I am not engaged
in rule-following behavior.
Compare this with my observation of the speed limit on my way to work
each morning. Assume I obey the imperative of the rule that "drivers' speed
must not exceed thirty-five miles per hour" when I drive my usual route to
work.213 On the hypothetical day that I alter my route, I will still obey this
imperative, even if I believe that I could safely exceed thirty-five miles per
hour because the alternative route is less hilly. Although the circumstances
have changed (I am driving on a road better physically suited to increased
speed), I will persist in obeying the imperative of the generalization that
drivers' speed must not exceed thirty-five miles per hour because among the
reasons that I observe the rule is the fact that it is a rule. 214 The rule provides an
independent reason for limiting my speed, and this independent reason has its
own normative force (which may include fear of sanction, concern that other
drivers will disapprove of my action, and so forth).215 Because of the normative
force attendant to the speed rule, I drive thirty-five miles per hour even when
my other reason for doing so (safety) no longer obtains. Therefore, I am
engaging in rule-following behavior.
Similarly, the fact that men usually do not wear dresses can be described as
a rule if the convergence of behavior (the fact that other men do not wear
dresses) provides an independent reason to act in conformity with the practice
of not wearing dresses, even if circumstances might otherwise recommend
dress-wearing.217 If the normative force that issues from the existence of the
regularity (e.g., expectation of conformity, fear of sanction for nonconformity,
or the desire to avoid being perceived as playing a "gender game" other than
the one associated with maleness or masculinity) is sufficient to cause an
individual to act in conformity with the regularity when he might otherwise not,
then the rule can be said to guide his behavior in a way that driving the same
route to work does not guide my behavior. 218
To explore the possibility that gender rules supply an independent reason
for acting in conformity with the imperative of the rules, consider the
relationship between a gender rule's imperative and the purpose of the rule.
Take, for example, the rule about men and dresses. Would applying individual
reasons (considerations of warmth, perhaps) to the situation (choosing what to
wear) produce the same result? Note that the result we are interested in is not a
particular man's decision to not wear a dress but instead the convergence of
213 See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing rule-following in the context of speed limits).
214
215 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 112-18.
216 Id. at 64-68, 112-18.




behavior that results in the fact that most men do not wear dresses. Would men
still refrain from wearing dresses if there were no longer an expectation that
they refrain from wearing dresses? In the hypothetical above, my reason for
driving the same way to work each day is that I believe it is the fastest route,
and my purpose in conforming to the regularity is to get to work faster. What
then is the purpose of these gendered regularities of behavior, and what are our
reasons for complying with those regularities?
In this light, we begin to see an interesting feature of gender rules: we seem
to follow gender rules without being able to identify a purpose for the rule or a
reason for following the rule absent the reasons that attend the fact that other
people follow the rule. In other words, we follow gender rules "blindly." 219
Moreover, this blind following attends gender rules beyond those that
govern gendered dress and deportment. When we examine the gender
generalizations that form the factual predicates of a variety of contested rules,
we encounter the same problem: women are more likely to be financially
dependent on a spouse;220 women have a special relationship to domesticity;221
women are more likely to miss work to care for children;222 women are paid
less for the same work;223 women are less likely to become partners than
similarly situated men; 224 and so forth. Each of these nonuniversal but
statistically sound generalizations articulates a regularity of behavior (with
varying degrees of accuracy). What is the purpose of each regularity, and what
are our reasons for acting in conformity with it?
Absent the reasons that fall out of the fact that others conform to these
regularities (which include not only attendant expectations and the fear of
social sanction, but also reasons related to facts that result from the regularity
such as a lack of alternative means for achieving a particular goal), our reasons
for behaving in conformity with these generalizations are unclear. It is difficult,
too, to discern the purpose of these rules. That is to say, it is not difficult to
understand why someone might be primarily responsible for something like
childcare and even why it might be socially helpful to have that expectation
regularized, but it is difficult to identify the purpose of drawing the distinction
219 For a discussion of the practice of rule-following in the absence of an identifiable purpose
("justification" in Schauer's and Wittgenstein's locutions), see WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 4, at § 201.
220 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973).
221 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
222 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a
female school psychologist with a young child could show that she was denied tenure because of the
sex-based assumption that women are more likely to care for children).
223 Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (holding that employers cannot justify paying
women lower wages because that is what they traditionally received under the going market rate).
224 See Paula Nailon, Perceptions of Partnership, Program Handout at ABA YLD, Miami Spring
Conference (May 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/yld/elibrary/miami05pdf/Perceptionof
Partnership.pdf.
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along sex lines. Or, more accurately, it is difficult to identify a purpose for the
distinction that we deem justified in light of the effect of gender rules.
Here, then, is where antidiscrimination discomfort meets with gendered
regularities. Although our legal and employer rules are often predicted on
background social rules regarding matters of etiquette or social expectation,
and these background rules often enforce hierarchical relationships (e.g.,
between a young person versus an older person or between a person in a
position of superior responsibility versus a subordinate), our sense that these
hierarchical background social rules are justified (in the sense that they fail to
arouse our antidiscrimination sensibilities) depends on our sense that the
hierarchical relationships they delineate are justified.
In the case of gendered regularities of behavior, our sense that gendered
hierarchical relationships are justified has ebbed (largely, if not exclusively, by
recalcitrant experience), but we remain entrenched in patterns of regulated
behavior that are now unmoored from their once-attendant purposes-purposes
which related to enforcing what we then believed to be justifiably distinct
realms of behavior for men and for women.225 As a consequence of this
unmooring, gender rules are situated in a precarious justificatory posture, at
least by antidiscrimination law's lights.
2. Gender Rules as Constitutive Rules
Schauer describes constitutive rules as rules that "create the very
possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind. They define and thereby
constitute activities that could not otherwise even exist." 226 The paradigmatic
example of constitutive rules is the rules of a game. To illustrate this point,
imagine that you ask me to play a game of tennis. I agree, but when we meet on
the court, instead of serving the ball and counting points in accord with the
rules of tennis, I use my racket to hammer at the net for ten minutes until it is
detached from its moorings, then declare myself the winner of our game of
"tennis." At this point, you may object to my claim by stating that while I may
have been engaged in some manner of activity during the preceding ten
minutes, I was not playing tennis. You would be justified in making this claim
because only by abiding by the rules of tennis am I able to engage in the
activity of playing tennis. In this sense, the rules of the game do more than
guide my behavior within the construct of the game; the rules define my
conduct as falling within the construct of the game. The rules of the game of
225 Some readers may contest the proposition that prescriptive gender generalizations, on the whole,
delineate hierarchical relationships rather than merely distinguish relationships (i.e., "male" versus
"female" or "feminine" versus "masculine"). While I take the proposition to be correct, a full defense of
this claim is unnecessary as nothing here depends upon it. At a minimum, sex-respecting generalizations
delineate distinct categories of behavior for different groups of people, and our sense that these distinct
categories of behavior are justified has, as discussed above, ebbed.
226 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 6. See also Rawls, supra note 5, at 25-28.
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tennis transform the behavior of hitting a ball with a racket into the activity of
tennis. In other words, the rules of tennis give the action of ball-hitting a
meaning that it could not possess without the game-constitutive rules.
Similarly, the gender generalizations at issue here structure our pervasive
gender understandings and tell us what "counts" as an appropriate gender
move.227 Knowledge of the generalization "men do not wear dresses," for
example, creates the possibility of describing a dress-wearing man as gender
transgressive or as "breaking" a gender rule. So in the Some Like It Hot
example, we can identify the existence (if not the formulation) of a "men do not
wear dresses" rule because we have identified that the audience must
necessarily know how to apply the rule in order to get the joke. The existence of
a rule and the audience's knowledge of the rule both are demonstrated by the
behavior of the filmmaker and the audience and the understanding that could
not pass between them but for their mutual recognition of and ability to apply
the rule.
In this way, gender rules possess constitutive force even in instances in
which the rule itself is not obeyed in the regulatory sense. Jack Lemmon, for
example, disobeys the rule that men do not wear dresses, but the constitutive
dimension of the rule nonetheless continues to determine the manner in which
the image of a man in a dress is received by the audience. Thus, as in the
example of tennis offered above, gender rules make gender-conscious
behaviors possible: they transform our actions (e.g., wearing clothing) into
actions that have meaning in the context of gender (e.g., wearing women's
clothing).
Another way of describing the constitutive force of gender rules is to say
that gender rules allow us to know which behaviors fit within which "gender
game." If a man wears a dress (absent excepting circumstances), we know he is
not playing the game of "gender-conforming male" because dresses are
associated with femininity, which is not usually associated with maleness and
so forth. In contrast, if a woman wears a dress (in the absence of other gender-
demarking behavior), we may perceive that she is playing the game of "gender-
conforming woman." The behavior (dress-wearing) remains the same, but our
understanding of the significance changes in these two contexts because we
have mastered a set of background understandings that create the requisite
connections between men and dresses and women and dresses.
Seen in this light, mastery of the constitutive function of gender rules-
although ubiquitous-actually represents a very complex ability. To apply
gender rules appropriately, one must do more than learn a system of possible
connections (e.g., "if man, then no dress"). This is a necessary but not sufficient
227 For a potentially analogous account of how pornography sets sexual conventions and determines
what counts as appropriate sexual "moves," see RAE LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM 25-63 (2009).
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condition for discerning the "correct" gender-generalization-based connections
in a given context.
When we demonstrate with our behavior that we have grasped the rule
(e.g., by laughing at Jack Lemmon), we demonstrate an ability that is
independent of both the explicit content of the propositions that undergird our
understanding and our own normative attitudes about the content of those
propositions. This knowledge of sex-respecting rules permeates our everyday
understandings, whether those understandings are explicitly structured into
propositional phrases (e.g., "men do not wear dresses") or, as is much more
often the case, those understandings are made manifest in our behaviors. We
are able to move fluidly from film-image to reaction without considering the
underlying proposition ("men do not wear dresses"), much less evaluating the
justification for the underlying proposition, because whatever our personal
views of gender roles and gender conformity, we are sufficiently conversant in
the rules of gender to be able to identify a transgression.
III. GENDER RULES AND REVISABILITY
Having explored the prescriptive features of gender generalizations, we
turn now to the question that of how and, more importantly, why prescriptive
gender generalizations are understood to be discriminatory when they serve as
the factual predicates of sex-respecting rules. Assuming that the subset of
gender generalizations that have been described heuristically as "stereotypes"
possess the prescriptive dimensions described above, a central question
remains: How do the prescriptive dimensions of these gender generalizations
interact with legal and employer rules in a manner that attracts or warrants
antidiscrimination-law scrutiny?
The answer to this question is two-fold: (1) we follow gender rules because
they are rules, although in most instances we have publicly disavowed their
original purposes, which leads to undesirable outcomes; and (2) when a legal or
employer rule adopts a gender rule as its factual predicate, the gender rule
becomes less revisable because the legal or employer rule provides an
228independent reason to act in conformity with the background rule. The
former point having been explicated above, this Part will discuss the latter.
A. The Commitment to Revisability
As discussed above, one of the problems with entrenched generalizations-
such as the gender generalizations at issue here-is that they are less sensitive
to recalcitrant experience and therefore persist in imposing their revealed flaws
(e.g., the emphasis of an irrelevant property or the suppression of a relevant
228 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 77-88.
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one) on future decision-making.229 Even in the face of newer and better
information, we treat gender generalizations as entrenched, and consequently
our gender rules resist revision.
This is not to say that gender rules are unrevisable. On the contrary, clearly
there are different gender rules in force today than were in force in the
nineteenth century or even the 1950s. Ultimately, the prescriptive potency of
gender rules is not indifferent to recalcitrant experience. When gender rules are
broken, the transgressive behavior calls into question not only the factual
predicate of the rule, but also the reasons for and purpose of the rule.
Eventually, our rational spade may find a way beneath the "blind" practice if
persistent recalcitrant experience causes us to begin to dig for a purpose for the
rule or a reason for adhering to it.
In this way, individual action that questions the universality or relevance of
sex-specific generalizations creates a space between our knowledge of how to
apply the rules and our endorsement of and compliance with those rules.
Through this glacially-paced process of transgression and questioning, we
appear to be able to rid ourselves of social rules that are no longer useful or
desirable. The fulcrum of this decaying-rule brush-clearing seems to be the lack
of compelling reasons or legitimate purposes that attend the gender rule in
question. We are able to stop obeying "blindly" when a sufficient degree of
nonconformity allows us to "see" the rule that forms the previously
unconsidered predicate of our gendered understandings and thereby situate
those rules within the same framework that we use to evaluate other types of
rules. Why don't men wear dresses? Why should women be primarily
responsible for domestic affairs?
Legal rules feature in this process of gender-rule revision in three
significant ways. First, legal rules obviously have the power to limit the range
of sanctions that attend the failure to comply with gender rules. When Ann
Hopkins broke the rule that "women are feminine or women are not non-
feminine)," the Supreme Court determined that while she may face assorted
sanctions for engaging in that behavior, losing her Price Waterhouse promotion
could not be among them.230 Indeed, while gender-rule breakers were once
vulnerable to penalties such as the loss of property, child custody, employment,
and even the loss of personal freedom, increasingly courts and Congress have
acted to remove both legal and employer sanctions from the array of penalties
that attend gender-rule violations.231 Once legal and employment penalties are
disallowed, social opprobrium becomes a lonely constable and the possibility
of revisiting the rule becomes less remote.
229 Id. at 47.
230 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
23 id.
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A second way in which legal rules affect the revisability of gender rules is
through their influence on the constitutive rules of gender. Legal rules have the
power to literally define what counts as a "man" or a "woman" (for example in
the context of marriage and pre-operative transsexuals), but, more subtly, legal
rules exert pressure on constitutive rules that appear inconsistent with legal
rules.2 3 2 We may feel differently about identifying an activity as gender
nonconforming after a legal rule announces that the activity must include both
sexes. For example, we might once have understood college basketball to be a
"man's game" such that women who played basketball were engaging in a type
of gender-nonconforming behavior.233 However, after Title IX fostered the
proliferation and success of women's collegiate basketball programs, our
judgments about whether women's basketball playing "counts" as gender-
nonconforming behavior are undermined.234
Of course, legal authority does not always exercise its dual power to
remove sanctions and de-constitute gendered understandings. The Ninth Circuit
declined to stand between Darlene Jespersen and the sanction she received at
the hands of Harrah's Casino, but it is precisely this calculus-whether to
protect the revisability of gender rules-that lies at the heart of
antidiscrimination law and theory's struggle to apply the stereotype heuristic.
And it is important to be clear that the calculus is not whether to protect
revisability on the one hand or remain neutral on the other. In allowing
Harrah's to enforce its Personal Best policy, the Ninth Circuit lent the
considerable constitutive weight of legal authority to the gender rules that
formed the Personal Best rule's predicate.2 35 A legal rule that says it is
permissible to require hyper-femininity of bartenders like Darlene Jespersen
but not of accountants like Ann Hopkins reinforces background gender rules
about what counts as appropriate gendered expressions for women in each of
those professions, a point to which we shall return in the final Section of this
analysis.
Finally, a third way in which legal rules can affect the revisability of
gender rules is by allowing a sex-respecting rule (which might be an employer
rule like "women must wear makeup" or a legal rule like "women cannot be
232 See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a post-
operative female-to-male transsexual person did not count as "male" and therefore could not marry a
woman in Florida because the term "male" within Florida's marriage statute refers to an immutable trait
determined at birth; therefore, no surgery could transform a person not born with this trait into a person
who counts as "male" for the purpose of the marriage statute); accord Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. App. 1999).
233 For a discussion of gender constitutive rules in the context of sports, see EILEEN McDONAGH &
LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN SPORTS (2007); see also
Robert Lipsyte, Who's Got Game, THE NATION, Mar. 24, 2008, (quoting McDonagh and Pappano as
describing sports as a "'social force that does not merely reflect gender differences, but in some cases,
creates, amplifies, and even imposes them.' It enforces 'the notion that men's activities and men's power
are the real thing and women's are not. Women's sports, like women's power, are second-class."').
234 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 (2006).
235 Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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estate administrators") to further entrench the gender generalization that forms
its factual predicate.236 A consideration of this phenomenon follows.
B. Gender Rules as Predicates
When a legal or employer rule adopts a gender generalization as its factual
predicate, the legal or employer rule applies its own independent prescriptive
pressure to the generalization. Consider again Price Waterhouse. 237In
transgressing the background gender rule "women are feminine (or women are
not non-feminine)" in other aspects of her life, Hopkins encountered whatever
social sanctions attend failing to adhere to that particular prescription.
However, in failing to adhere to that prescription at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins
238faced a new and distinct sanction: she was not promoted. The desire to avoid
the sanction that independently attends Price Waterhouse's rule that "women
must be feminine at Price Waterhouse" supplies an independent reason for
complying with the background gender rule.239
In other words, because of Price Waterhouse's rule, Hopkins would have a
reason to behave femininely, even if there was no background social
expectation that women behave femininely, nor any regularity of behavior
concerning the feminine behavior of women. If Hopkins wants to be promoted
at Price Waterhouse, she has a reason to act in conformity with its informal
rule, regardless of the reason for or purpose of the rule. In this way, the Price
Waterhouse rule has the effect of enforcing the imperative of the background
gender rule without having to or even being able to provide a reason for or
justification of the background prescription. This is true even though the
reasons for and justification of Price Waterhouse's rule depend on the
background gender rule. Absent the regularity of behavior reflected in the
background gender rule ("women are feminine (or women are not non-
feminine)"), Price Waterhouse would have no reason for imposing that
requirement on its female employees, nor could the sex-respecting requirement
be justified in light of some defensible purpose-it would, in effect, be
arbitrary.
Another way of understanding the relationship of Price Waterhouse's rule
to the background gender rule that forms its factual predicate is that the Price
Waterhouse rule further entrenches the background gender rule, and it does so
in a way that is qualitatively different from the process by which the
background gender generalization is itself both entrenched and-more
significantly-revised. The manner in which a legal or employer rule functions
236 SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 74 (explaining that formal rules can either treat their factual
predicates as entrenched or defeasible).
23. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
239 Id.
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to further entrench the background gender prescriptions that form its factual
predicates, as well as the manner in which this entrenchment renders
prescriptive gender generalizations less revisable, are considered below.
1. Enforcement, Exploitation, and Instantiation
To explore how sex-respecting legal and employer rules further entrench
gender rules, it is necessary to take a step back and identify some structural
features of rules. Schauer explains that rules are comprised of four basic parts:
(1) the imperative that pressures behavior (often formulated but sometimes, as
in the instance of gender rules, unformulated); (2) a factual predicate; (3) a
reason (this is a causal claim-it refers to the reason the rule is adopted or
observed); and (4) a purpose (the aim of the rule or the evil it seeks to
avoid). 240 To explore the mechanics of these component parts, let us consider
again the employer rule that was at issue in Jespersen.241
As discussed above, the putatively sex-stereotyping practice at issue in
Jespersen concerned Harrah's "Personal Best" grooming policy that required
female employees to wear makeup and forbade male employees from doing the
same. In fact, not only did the casino require its female employees to wear
makeup, it required them to meet an elaborate set of grooming requirements
that included teasing their hair, applying face power, blush, and mascara, and
so forth, 242 such that compliance with the policy resulted in the construction of
a hyper-feminized self-presentation. 2 43
240 Schauer describes the rule's aim (or the evil it seeks to avoid) as its "justification," but because this
use of justification can be easily confused with claims that a rule is normatively or morally justified, I
refer to the rule's aim as its purpose. SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 26; see also supra note 8
(distinguishing connotations of "justified" in the context of rules).
241 Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
242 The "Personal Best" policy imposed the following mandatory requirements on female employees:
* Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down at all
times, no exceptions.
Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee's skin tone. No runs.
* Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or length.
* Makeup (face powder, blush, and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
complimentary colors. Lip color must be wom at all times.
Id. at 1114.
Further, to aid its female employees in, assumedly, achieving their "personal best," Harrah's hired
at considerable expense a makeup consultant who met with each female employee and demonstrated for
each employee how she should apply the requisite makeup. At the end of the session a picture was taken
of the professionally made-up employee and placed in the employee's file so that a manger could use the
photograph as a baseline for determining, each day, whether the employee was in compliance with the
"Personal Best" requirement. Avery & Crain, supra note 11, at 46, 76.
Harrah's "Personal Best" policy asked the following of its male employees:
* Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
* Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No colored
polish is permitted.
* Eye and facial makeup is not permitted.
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
243 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
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Plaintiff Darlene Jespersen challenged the requirement, advancing the
theory that requiring her to conform to traditional notions of femininity
constituted impermissible sex stereotyping in violation of Title VII as
interpreted in Price Waterhouse.244 However, Jespersen had in mind PWII,
while the Ninth Circuit was of a mind, on this occasion, to embrace PWI. In an
en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Jespersen's framing of the
issue, finding instead that the relevant inquiry was whether the policy
disproportionately burdened female employees compared with male
employees.245 Concluding that the rule placed equal burdens on both male and
female employees, the court held that the policy did not constitute
246discriminatory sex stereotyping.
The Ninth Circuit used the elastic "stereotype" heuristic to arrive at its
conclusion. Yet a rule-centered analysis reveals features of the relationship
between Harrah's rule and background gender rules that are obscured by the
"stereotype" heuristic. Let us begin with Harrah's rule's imperative. For the
purposes of this analysis, we can simplify the Personal Best Policy and
summarize its imperative in the following three propositions: (1) only female
employees wear makeup; (2) female employees must wear makeup; and (3)
247female employees must wear a lot of makeup. However, to understand the
significance of these imperatives, we must situate them within the context of
the other components of Harrah's rule.
The next task then is to identify the reason for Harrah's Personal Best rule.
The reason for the rule is, literally, the reason why Harrah's adopted the rule.248
This is a causal claim. 249 In explaining the reason that Harrah's adopted its
policy, the casino stated that its aim was to create uniformity among its
employees that would yield a greater degree of brand recognition among
customers.250 However, it is useful to examine whether this reason provides an
adequate causal link to each of the rule's three imperatives. For example,
"creating uniformity" provides a reason for having a rule, meaning in this
instance a uniform set of grooming requirements. In claiming that uniformity is
the reason for its rule, Harrah's is likening its rule to a driving-on-the-right-side
rule: while it does not matter whether all motorists drive on the right side of the
244 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
245 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1104.
246 Id. at 1112.
247 Rather than describing the Personal Best policy as a single rule with three imperatives, it would be
more accurate to describe the policy as three separate rules. However, given that various background
gender rules feature in the analysis of Harrah's Personal Best policy, it is simpler to describe the policy
itself as a single rule. See SCHAUER, RULES, supra note 1, at 62-64 (describing the difference between
rules and their formulations and stating that two different formulations of a similar prescriptive
proposition can be said to represent two distinct rules if the different formulations apply different
pressure to behavior such that the application of the formulations can produce a different result in at
least one case).
248 Id. at 23.
249 id.
250 Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1107.
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road or the left, it matters very much that all motorists drive on the same side of
the road. Here, Harrah's claim is that it does not matter whether employees
appear hyper-feminine or hyper-masculine as long as whatever "lane" of
grooming behavior is selected, that lane is observed by all employees. But
creating uniformity does not provide a reason for having this rule-that is, a
sex-differentiated rule-and it is the sex-differentiated aspect of the rule that
causes it to be of antidiscrimination law concern. In fact, if uniformity were the
sole or even primary reason for adopting a grooming requirement, requiring
that all employees or no employees wear makeup would provide a more
sensible fit with this goal.
Readers may object here, noting that asking all employees to wear makeup
would be foolish. But what renders this proposal foolish? What piece of
information do we need to understand what is wrong with an all-employee
makeup rule? Here we begin to see the usefulness of the thinking-in-slow-
motion approach offered by a rule-centered analysis. When we examine the
rule's assumptions at this level, we realize that a background rule (which, being
gender-rule conversant, we would otherwise reflexively apply) is required to
make sense of the sex-differentiation in this context. When we examine the
connection between the imperative of Harrah's rule and the reason offered by
Harrah's for having the rule, we learn what we already know: that usually only
women wear makeup. 251 The gender generalization "usually only women wear
makeup" is a factual predicate of this sex-respecting rule.
To return to our "lanes" of gendered behavior metaphor, Harrah's is
requiring some conformists to drive on the left and other conformists to drive
on the right. It is the reason for this distinction that is of interest to
antidiscrimination analysis, not the fact that Harrah's regulates driving at all.
The reason for this "lanes" distinction cannot be "to create uniformity."
Harrah's may have been interested in creating uniformity among its female
employees and another kind of uniformity among its male employees.
However, the uniformity-reason offers us nothing in terms of understanding the
distinction we are really interested in. We are not interested in learning why
Harrah's chose to regularize the face-uniform of its employees. 252 Instead, we
are interested in answering the question: why only women?
The uniformity reason also does not help us with the second aspect of the
Personal Best imperative: women must wear makeup.25 3 Uniformity would be
251 Judge Kozinski also questioned the factual predicate of this imperative. In his dissent, Kozinski
wrote, "[w]omen's faces, just like those of men, can be perfectly presentable without makeup: it is a
cultural artifact that women raised in the United States learn to put on-and presumably enjoy
wearing-cosmetics. But cultural norms change ... . I see no justification for forcing (female
employees] to conform to Harrah's quaint notion of what a 'real woman' looks like." Jespersen, 444
F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
252 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (describing Harrah's rule as requiring
Jespersen to wear "a facial uniform (full makeup)").
253Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
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more easily achieved by a rule that women cannot wear makeup at Harrah's
(or, as already suggested, that no one can wear makeup at Harrah's). The
uniformity reason leaves us with a second unsatisfied question: why makeup?
Finally, with respect to our reason-skepticism, Harrah's uniformity reason
does not help us with the third Personal Best imperative: women must wear a
lot of makeup. Even if our first two questions were adequately addressed, this
imperative leaves us wondering: why so much makeup?
Because Harrah's espoused reason for the rule leaves these three questions
unsatisfied, we might look next to the purpose of Harrah's rule. The purpose of
the rule is not to oppress women or harass people who do not conform to
gender rules-instead, the purpose of the rule is to attract customers. 254 In other
words, Harrah's adopted the Personal Best rule because it believed that
application of the rule would please customers. Are the rule's three imperatives
reasonably causally linked to the aim of the rule such that we would describe
the rule as justified in light of its purpose?
In fact, the causal relationship between each of the rule's imperatives and
the rule's purpose depends upon a gender generalization that serves as the
Personal Best rule's factual predicate. We have already indentified the factual
predicate upon which the first imperative ("only women can wear makeup at
Harrah's") depends: usually only women wear makeup. But the second
imperative ("women must wear makeup") also reveals a factual predicate:
makeup (or potentially the absence of makeup, as the rule could be understood
to avoid the evil of women like Jespersen appearing without makeup at work)
signifies something about the wearer. 255 A thorough analysis of exactly what
makeup or the absence of makeup might or must signify could occupy a journal
volume, but it is sufficient for our purpose here to observe that Harrah's
concluded that requiring its female employees to wear makeup would signal
something about those employees that would please customers. Harrah's, then,
was exploiting a constitutive gender rule: the presence of makeup on women
"counts" as something or communicates something in the same way that the
presence of a dress on Jack Lemmon does. Harrah's employed our shared
gender grammar to create an understanding between the casino and its patrons
in the same manner that the Some Like It Hot filmmaker created an
understanding with the film's audience.
The third imperative of the Personal Best policy (women must wear a lot of
makeup) also reveals a gender generalization as its factual predicate: women in
the service industry are (or should be) hyper-feminine, while white-collar,
professional women are not (or should not be). Harrah's rule does not require
its female employees to wear a conservative or neutral face-uniform. Harrah's
254 Harrah's crafted the rule to increase brand-recognition so that it could attract more customers. See
Avery & Crain, supra note 11, at 66.
255 See, e.g., HELLMAN, supra note 32, at 43.
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rule requires women to tease, curl, or style their hair, apply face powder,
mascara, and rouge, and wear lip color at all times. 25 6 To aid us in identifying
the contours of the factual predicate of this imperative, let us imagine the rule
was imposed not by a casino but by the Supreme Court. A rule that demands
that Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor not appear on the
bench without teased hair and lipstick (while only requiring the other seven
justices to keep their hair above their shirt collars) would be absurd. But why is
it absurd? Why is requiring that Sotomayor rather than Jesperson rather tease
her hair nonsensical? The reason the rule would be unjustifiable in the context
of the Supreme Court is again reducible to our gender-rule conversancy: we
know (although we may never formulate this knowledge into propositions as
explicit as the one that follows) that the appropriateness of women's gender
expression varies markedly depending on class context.257 In other words, we
know the rule about Supreme Court Justices and teased hair the same way we
know the rule about men and dresses, and the justification of Harrah's
imperative depends upon that background rule.
Moreover, as with the factual predicate of the second imperative, Harrah's
rule both exploits the constitutive force of the background rules regarding
teased hair and a certain style of makeup and also instantiates the background
gender generalization that forms its predicate. Harrah's workers' hyper-
feminized gendered presentations "count" as something specific within our
gendered understandings, and they also provide a concrete example of the
generalization that "women in the service industry are (or should be) hyper-
feminine."258 When we walk into Harrah's casinos we encounter evidence that
supports the background generalization and reinforces its descriptive accuracy.
Finally, Harrah's rule instantiates background gender rules and in so doing
it treats the background gender rules it instantiates as either justified (in light of
some inherent difference between men and women) or as merely conventional
and therefore not requiring justification beyond the fact that they are merely our
practices.259 For example, Harrah's rule does not supply a reason (independent
256 Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1107.
257 Interestingly, the appropriateness of men's gendered expressions seems much less tied to class
context. Scalia's gendered presentation, for example, would meet Harrah's Personal Best requirements.
For a compelling consideration of hierarchical structures in the context of gendered expressions, see
Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
258 For a discussion of the relationship between hyper-femininity and class structures in the context of
Harrah's rule, see Ann McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy Dress
Codes, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 257 (2007); and Pizer, supra note 131.
259 The Harrah's rule-component exercise teaches us an interesting lesson: once we understand that the
reason for and justification of a gender rule (e.g., men do not usually wear dresses) is distinct from the
reason for and justification of the employer rule that adopts the gender generalization as its factual
predicate (e.g., men cannot wear dresses here, at this job), it becomes clear that the employer's rule
cannot provide a reason for or justification of the underlying gender rule, even if the employer's rule is
itself justified in light of its purpose (attracting customers). The underlying sex classification, however,
can and does play an essential role in justifying the employer's rule.
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of the background gender rule) for the distinction that only women can wear
makeup. Instead, Harrah's rule instantiates the rule as "simply our practice."
Indeed, the purpose of Harrah's rule is to enforce this background rule because
it is a social practice. Harrah's rule instantiates gender rule imperatives as if
they require no justification and thereby reinforces the practice of following
gender rules "blindly."
So Harrah's rule further entrenches the gender generalizations that form the
factual predicates of its rule in three ways. First, Harrah's rule directly enforces
the gender generalization "only women wear makeup" by adopting it as an
imperative and attaching a new set of sanctions to its prescription. Further,
Harrah's rule exploits the constitutive force of the gender rules that form the
factual predicates of its three imperatives. Finally, Harrah's rule instantiates
background sex-based distinctions and in doing so treats those distinctions as
though they do not require justification-when in fact they do. The effect of
this enforcement, instantiation, and exploitation on the revisability of
background gender rules is considered below.
2. Revisability and Formal Rules
The relationship between Harrah's formal rule and its factual predicates
obstructs the revisability of those predicates in several ways. First, when
Harrah's rule entrenches a gender rule, the rule is reinforced in ways that
noncompliance with the gender rule fails to undermine. Recall that Harrah's
rule bears its own prescriptive force. As discussed above, the rule imposes a
sanction structure that is independent of the sanctions that attend
noncompliance with the background gender rule. Because of this, conformity
with Harrah's rule reinforces the background generalization by suggesting a
willingness to conform to the background rule that may, in individual cases, be
false. For example, a male bartender at Harrah's might decide to conform to
Harrah's no-makeup rule to save his job, while in the absence of Harrah's rule
he would have worn makeup to work. His conformity at work, however,
appears from the outside to be indistinguishable from conformity with the
background gender rule ("only women wear makeup"). In this example,
Harrah's rule has the effect of suppressing what would otherwise be an instance
of recalcitrant experience: the male bartender is conscripted into reinforcing the
generalization that men do not usually wear makeup.
Similarly, as discussed above, a formal and authoritative rule like Harrah's
can exploit the background gender rule's constitutive function to create a
desired gendered meaning. Harrah's rule appears arbitrary and senseless absent
an understanding of background gender generalizations about women, makeup,
hyper-femininity, and class structures, just as the train platform scene is
senseless in the absence of the ability to apply rules about men and dresses. The
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"gender grammar" of background gender rules creates the effect that Harrah's
seeks: it constitutes the relationship between Harrah's female employees and
hyper-femininity (i.e., a hyper-feminine-presenting bartender is making an
appropriate gender "move"), behavior that would be differently understood in
another context, notably, at an accounting firm such as Price Waterhouse. But
in applying the generalizations constitutively, Harrah's is both endorsing from
an authoritative position judgments about what "counts" as appropriate
behavior in the casino context and pressuring behavior to conform to its
endorsement. In so doing, Harrah's rule has the effect of dominating (or
participating in a larger commercially-driven convergence that dominates) our
gender-constituted conversations about women, femininity, and casino-type
environments.
Finally, Harrah's rule is both formulated and revised by a process that is
distinct from the process that forms and revises the background generalizations
it instantiates. For example, the women-only makeup imperative appears from
the outside indistinguishable from the background rule that it instantiates, but
the purpose of Harrah's rule has nothing to do with the purpose of the
background rule (whatever that might have been). Harrah's rule is not the
product of truth-seeking, hierarchy-building, or cooperative social organization;
it is an exercise in profit-increasing. Yet although it is formulated in a manner
that is unrelated to the forces that formed the background generalization and
although Harrah's rule further entrenches the background generalizations in the
manner described above, Harrah's rule is not subject to the same glacially-
paced revision process to which the background rules are subject. Harrah's may
retain its instantiation of the women-only makeup rule as long as it serves
Harrah's purpose of attracting customers. The process by which other evidence
supporting a gender rule is undermined (i.e., the presentation of recalcitrant
experience) need not affect Harrah's rule. In this way, Harrah's rule, with its
own purpose and reasons, obstructs the dead-wood-clearing process by which
we seem to rid ourselves of "bad old days" 260 notions about men and women.
C. New Gender Games: Jespersen and the Future ofRevisability
Having explored the relationship between formal rules like Harrah's
Personal Best and the background gender generalizations it entrenches, it is
important to return to the role that antidiscrimination law potentially plays in
policing that relationship. Rather than applying pressure directly to the
background prescriptions themselves (e.g., "women have a special relationship
to domesticity"), antidiscrimination law stands between gender rules and the
legal or employer rules that would (1) further entrench those rules; and (2)
render them less revisable (e.g., by prohibiting employers from conditioning
260 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 586 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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benefits on the assumption that women have a special relationship to
domesticity). The judgment then that antidiscrimination law must then make is
when the obstruction of the revisability of a particular gender rule is tolerated
by the law and when it is not.
However, in making these judgments, antidiscrimination law is also
assuming the role of referee in a subset of our gender-constituted conversations.
As alluded to above, in determining that demands for femininity are
inappropriate in the professional context of Price Waterhouse but appropriate in
the context of Harrah's Casino, antidiscrimination law is doing more than
permitting background assumptions about gender expressions in those contexts
to stand. Legal authority is instead selecting among various gender
generalizations to determine which should "count" as appropriate moves in
certain contexts. The judgment that Jespersen was not harmed in the way that
Hopkins was harmed relies on a series of gendered understandings about what
is appropriately linked to success in a male-dominated, serious, professional,
and intellectual context like an accounting firm and what is appropriately
linked to success in a decidedly less heady job like bartending at a casino.
These judgments themselves turn on gendered understandings about what
gender markers like makeup and teased hair say about qualities like
intellectualism and seriousness. 261
In this sense, antidiscrimination law is constantly engaged in both
refereeing and constituting new and existing gender games. Legal authority is
called to referee when plaintiffs like Jespersen require the court to determine
what gendered qualities "count" as being appropriately causally linked to
success in particular instances. The law is likewise engaged in the activity of
constituting new gender games when it announces a new rule: femininity is not
appropriately causally linked to the success of accountants, but it can be
demanded of bartenders. Once the rule is announced, behavior bends to
accommodate it, and our understanding of what is an appropriate "move" for a
casino owner, bartender, Price Waterhouse partner, and gender-nonconforming
accountant is brought into new relief. Our settled understandings of these
relationships consequently are either pressured or confirmed.2 62
Moreover, it may be the case that our antidiscrimination intuitions are
undisturbed by a rule that holds, "women in the service industry are (or should
be) hyper-feminine, while white-collar professional women are not (or should
not be)." But to reach this conclusion, deeper questions about the implication of
such a rule must, at a minimum, be acknowledged. For example, given that
261 See Meredith Render, Misogyny, Androgyny, and Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a
Gender-Deconstructed World, 29 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 99 (2006) (describing the hierarchical ordering
of gender roles).
262 In this sense, Harrah's rule is relevant in understanding the gender "moves" that are appropriate for
bartenders only until antidiscrimination law evaluates Harrah's rule. However, once antidiscrimination
law permits or disallows Harrah's rule, the legal rule becomes the referee of this particular gender game.
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gender rules regarding male gender expression tend to be relatively stable
across class and status contexts, do sex-respecting rules that identify what
"counts" as an appropriate "type" of woman according to class and status
contexts define women or confine women's opportunities in a way akin to rules
concerning other types of behavior restrictions (e.g., women and domesticity)?
Does the fact that women can be required to assimilate to male norms in some
contexts but are not permitted to escape femininely-associated norms in others
suggest or even instantiate implicit notions about where women belong, which
"type" of woman is useful for which type of work, and which class or status
contexts appropriately require women (and men) to apologize for failing to
embody a male ideal? 263
So, gender rules do change and decidedly have changed. Most sex-
respecting rules that prescribe the exclusion of women from a category of
opportunities have fallen away. No longer can Price Waterhouse justify
declining to hire a female accountant based on the assumption that "women are
bad at accounting." But in the aftermath of this dead-wood-clearing process,
new gender games are emerging, and antidiscrimination law and theory must
remain cognizant of the role they necessarily play in both constituting and
mediating these new conversations. At a minimum, in evaluating the
"discriminatory assumptions" of sex-respecting rules, courts and commentators
should be knowledgeable about the relationship between rule sets and the
manner in which the recognition of some predicates as "discriminatory" (e.g.,
"women have a unique relationship to domesticity") and not others (e.g.,
"women in the service industry are (or should be) hyper-feminine, while white-
collar professional women are not (or should not be)") affects the degree to
which new and potentially disquieting gender rules emerge.
CONCLUSION: ELIMINATING THE "STEREOTYPE" HEURISTIC
The concept of "sex stereotype" is analytically empty. While the heuristic
was once helpful in articulating then-nascent objections to the use of legal and
employer rules to impede the revision of potentially unjustified gender rules,
courts and commentators are now equipped with sufficient knowledge about
the prescriptive dimensions of gender generalizations to abandon the heuristic
and apply analyses directly to the issues at hand.
In engaging in this process, courts and commentators should be particularly
aware of the new "gender games" that are emerging through the constitutive
force of gender generalizations and the slow process of entrenchment-revision
that is at least partially mediated and molded by antidiscrimination law dictates.
In particular, new associations that cross-reference conceptions of femininity
263 For a discussion of how gendered norms that vary across class contexts reflect intuitions about the
appropriateness of women in those contexts, see Render, supra note 261.
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and masculinity with limiting conceptions of competence and class-based status
are at risk of becoming further entrenched (and thereby rendered less revisable)
by legal and employer rules. These new "gender games" should not escape the
attention of courts and commentators as they strive to evaluate the sufficiency
of the factual predicates of sex-respecting rules.
Due in part to antidiscrimination law's commitment to protecting the
revisability of a subset of gender rules, our gender rules have clearly been
changing. Factual predicates such as "women have a special relationship to
domesticity" have given way to predicates such as "women in the service
industry are (or should be) hyper-feminine, while white-collar professional
women are not (or should not be)." However, we should be careful not to
replicate past analytic missteps by failing to recognize these new gender rules
or by purporting to assess new gender rules solely in terms of their descriptive
accuracy. In terms of these new gender generalizations, the antidiscrimination
question remains what it has always been: whether legal and employer rules
should be permitted to entrench these generalizations or whether the
prescriptive force of legal and employer rules must remain neutral while the
gender game players negotiate the rules of the game.
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